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Comments
STREAMING IS THE NAME OF THE GAME: WHY SPORTS
LEAGUES SHOULD ADAPT TO CONSUMERS AND FOLLOW
AD DOLLARS TOWARDS LIVE STREAMING
I. COMBATING CONSUMERS WITHIN STREAMING PLATFORMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SPORTS BROADCASTING AND
LIVE STREAMING
Live streaming is changing the way sporting events are broad-
casted, advertised, and viewed by consumers.1  The popularity of
live streaming stems from the growth of the internet and the emer-
gence of Google, YouTube, and Facebook as the most trafficked
websites.2  These websites are part of peoples’ daily lives and pro-
1. See generally Josh Mathews, Sports Broadcasting Blackouts: A Harbinger of
Change in Rapidly Evolving Media Landscape, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 202 (2018)
(addressing evolving media landscape within scope of sports); see also Juan Pablo
Manterola, Online Streaming Is the Future of Sports Broadcasting: It’s Not ‘If’ You’ll Cut
Cable, but ‘When’, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesagencycouncil/2017/04/14/online-streaming-is-the-future-of-sports-broad-
casting-its-not-if-youll-cut-cable-but-when/#5675d5533bbc [https://perma.cc/
2RUV-8939] (noting decline in cable company subscriptions and suggesting sports
broadcasting needs to be more like movies: go directly to consumers); Derek
Thompson, TV’s Ad Apocalypse is Getting Closer, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/ 08/tvs-ad-apocalypse-is-
coming/536394/ [https://perma.cc/2X7C-V2EW] (questioning where forty billion
dollars a year of advertising would go in ad-free streaming service) (emphasis ad-
ded); cf. Sara Fischer, TV Advertising Projections Reduced Due to Increased Cord-Cutting,
AXIOS (Sept. 13, 2017),  https://www.axios.com/tv-advertising-projections-reduced
-due-to-increased-cord-cutting-1513305461-b103f7af-1019-4437-88d8-3d15caf2
a8dc.html [https://perma.cc/59XP-XRPN] (reporting decrease of one billion dol-
lars for TV advertising due to cord-cutting).  For further discussion on how live
streaming is changing the way sports are broadcasted, see infra notes 16–52 and R
accompanying text.
2. See Andrew Marantz, Reddit and the Struggle to Detoxify the Internet, THE NEW
YORKER (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/19/
reddit-and-the-struggle-to-detoxify-the-internet [https://perma.cc/5MGE-UQQK]
(listing Reddit, one commonly used source for pirating and streaming content, as
website with fourth most traffic); see also Jeff Desjardins, These Are the Top 100 Web-
sites of the Internet, According to Web Traffic, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2017, 8:08 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/top-100-websites-web-traffic-2017-3 [https://
perma.cc/LW5N-5TLV] (identifying Google, YouTube, and Facebook as top three
most trafficked websites, followed by Amazon as fourth, Reddit as seventh, and
Yahoo and Twitter, other websites providing streaming content, as fifth and ninth,
respectively); cf. Jerri Collins, The Top 10 Most Popular Sites of 2018, LIFEWIRE,
https://www.lifewire.com/most-popular-sites-3483140 [https://perma.cc/LW5N-
5TLV] (last updated Jan. 2, 2019) (identifying Google, YouTube, and Facebook as
(323)
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vide access to live stream content such as sporting events, television
shows, daily news, and friends’ activities.3  As a result, streaming ser-
vices are now vital to consumers.4  Consider the seventieth Prime-
time Emmy Awards, which aired in September 2018, as an
example.5  The Primetime Emmy Awards ironically drew its smallest
viewership audience in the last decade, even though more shows
were awarded from streaming services like Netflix, Amazon, and
Hulu than ever before.6
The rise of streaming services and the use of streaming tech-
nology by social media websites like Facebook and Twitter have al-
tered the methods advertisers use to reach consumers and the way
consumers choose content to watch.7  Live streaming technology
top three most trafficked websites, but Yahoo as eighth and Amazon as tenth most
visited websites).
3. See Scott Kleinberg, Live Streaming: The Next Big Thing in Social Media, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-so-social-live
streaming-meerkat-periscope-20150401-column.html [https://perma.cc/QUK6-
NFZE?type=image] (looking specifically at Twitter for example and defining live
streaming as broadcasting in real time); see also Karl Kaufman, Will Facebook Become
the Preferred Way for Fans to Watch Sports?, FORBES (June 15, 2018, 12:50 PM), https:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/karlkaufman/2018/06/15/will-facebook-become-the-pre-
ferred-way-for-fans-to-watch-sports/#9eb833a2746f [https://perma.cc/8ZNN-
NMVJ] (reporting how “live videos on Facebook generate six times more discus-
sion than recorded videos”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See generally Mathews, supra note 1 (addressing consumer reliance on R
streaming for sports); Sara Fischer, The Battle for the Future of TV, AXIOS (Oct. 11,
2018), https://www.axios.com/digital-video-wars-heat-up-4ccda248-c8c8-4d2c-9acf-
ebef67607870.html [https://perma.cc/V9FX-W9UZ] (“The race to own the future
of TV is intensifying, with mobile and streaming video companies looking to build
or expand video services that will launch by next year.”).
5. See Liane Starr, Netflix and HBO Set the Pace at 70th Primetime Emmys Telecast,
with Amazon and FX Close Behind, TELEVISION ACAD. (Sept. 17, 2018), https://
www.emmys.com/news/awards-news/70th-emmy-winners [https://perma.cc/
A84L-WLRM] (reporting on results of Emmy Awards from September 2018).
6. See Stephen Battaglio, Emmy Awards’ TV Audience Hits New Low with 10.2
Million Viewers, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-emmy-ratings-20180918-story.html [https://perma.cc/
U73B-5937] (“The Emmy Awards telecast is not the only trophy show to see
smaller audiences, as a growing number of viewers prefer to watch clips of the programs
online rather than sit through a three-hour telecast with commercials.”) (emphasis
added).
7. See Fischer, supra note 4 (examining expansion of streaming video compa- R
nies, such as Netflix and Amazon which have each totaled more than one hundred
million subscribers, and noting no TV networks are “looking to own the future of
television”); see also Ben Popper, The Great Unbundling: Cable TV as We Know It is
Dying, THE VERGE (Apr. 22, 2015, 10:34 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/4/
22/8466845/cable-tv-unbundling-verizon-espn-apple [https://perma.cc/BMS2-
MW2Y] (indicating main goal of broadcasting is advertisements); Thompson, supra
note 1 (suggesting consumers prefer streaming to cable, as “each ad-free streaming R
product is yet another reason to dump the ad-rich cable bundle”).  See generally
Kaufman, supra note 3 (discussing Facebook’s use of streaming for personal pur- R
poses and sports); see also Cori Faklaris et al., Legal and Ethical Implications of Mobile
2
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has had a particularly strong impact on professional sports leagues.8
Within the last several years, live streaming technology has led to a
difficult decision for sports leagues to confront.9  Leagues must de-
termine whether to keep sporting coverage in-house and provide
easy access for consumers to stream content and watch events, or
keep the coverage on major broadcasting networks like they have
traditionally done.10
This Comment argues leagues should decide to stream their
content, because if they do, there is no shortage of potential buyers
for the streaming rights.11  Facebook and Twitter are two examples
of eager buyers acting as non-traditional broadcast companies
jumping at the opportunity to stream sporting events.12  Over the
last several years, Facebook first agreed to stream one Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) game per week for one season, and then agreed
to exclusively stream twenty-five games the following season.13  Twit-
Live-Streaming Video Apps, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY DIG. LIBRARY, In Proc.
of the 18th Int’l Conf. on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and
Services Adjunct (2016), https://doi.org/10.1145/2957265.2961845 [https://
perma.cc/E7XY-GPNT] (describing live streaming video’s surge in society and
Facebook’s live technology platform).  “A Cisco White Paper estimates that by
2017, video will account for 30% of all internet traffic and 70% of mobile traffic.” Id.
(emphasis added) (implying surge of mobile traffic to increased consumer use of
streaming).
8. See, e.g., At the Gate and Beyond, PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, at 10–13 (Oct. 2018),
available at www.pwc.com/us/sports [https://perma.cc/PKL3-R7RB] (hereinafter
“PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK”) (predicting streaming rise will continue in professional
sports); see also Kaufman, supra note 3 (reporting on streaming deals between in- R
ternet service providers and sports leagues).
9. See Manterola, supra note 1 (discussing challenges presented to sports R
leagues by rise of streaming).
10. See id. (suggesting individual sports teams could “bypass traditional broad-
casting” but it is unclear whether major sports leagues’ see streaming “as a profita-
ble alternative to cable or paid streaming TV”).
11. See Lara O’Reilly, Streaming Sports Service DAZN Aims to Introduce Ad Model
Without All the Repetition, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2018, 9:29 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/streaming-sports-service-dazn-aims-to-introduce-ad-model-
without-all-the-repetition-1542998439 [https://perma.cc/36VR-MTNY] (“Live
sports continue to deliver large audiences to TV networks otherwise suffering
steady ratings erosion.  They also give viewers a heavy dose of what’s called ‘ad
frequency.’”); Elizabeth Winkler, The Real Streaming Race Starts . . . Now, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 1, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/let-the-streaming-wars-be-
gin-11549017001?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/NRN4-CFPL] (“Peo-
ple already have multiple streaming subscriptions.  Eventually it may be the norm
to pay for a bundle of platforms.”).
12. See, e.g., Manterola, supra note 1 (reporting on Facebook’s interest in live R
streaming); Kaufman, supra note 3 (comparing Facebook’s and Twitter’s stream- R
ing ambitions).
13. See Kaufman, supra note 3 (“Facebook overhauled its platform to en- R
courage more interactive and engaging content, and video is at the forefront of
that change.”) (emphasis added).
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ter paid the National Football League (“NFL”) ten million dollars
for the rights to air Thursday Night Football games in 2016, and
Amazon later purchased those rights for fifty million dollars.14  Am-
azon also bought the rights to live stream twenty English Premier
League soccer games for 2019, and in 2018 YouTube bought the
rights to air Major League Soccer games for Los Angeles’ new
team.15
Even though some leagues have signed contracts to provide
streaming services, those same leagues, and others, are hesitant to
embrace streaming because of the threat of potential infringement
of their intellectual property rights.16  Sports broadcasters are also
wary of live streaming because they fear live streaming websites and
apps “will cannibalize viewers.”17  Sports leagues are cautious be-
cause they derive most of their revenue from ticket sales and the
sale of broadcasting rights.18  Broadcasting live sporting events is a
huge revenue opportunity for sports leagues and broadcasters.19
14. See id. (noting content is available to paying Amazon Prime members and
for free through Amazon’s Twitch service).
15. See Ivana Kottasova, Soccer Binge! Amazon Will Show 20 Premier League
Matches in UK, CNN (June 7, 2018, 8:27 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/
07/media/amazon-premier-league-rights/index.html [https://perma.cc/69YB-
MYME] (reporting Amazon’s deal); see also Kaufman, supra, note 3 (discussing You- R
Tube’s deal and pointing out YouTube is owned by Google).  To clarify, YouTube
is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., and Alphabet Inc. was created by Google
“bl[owing] up its entire corporate structure to form a new parent company.”  Av-
ery Hartmans & Greg Sandoval, The Company Formerly Known as Google is Far Bigger
than Most People Realize, BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://www.busi
nessinsider.com/alphabet-google-company-list-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/DG2K-
RYMX] (noting corporate restructuring was in 2015 and meant to ease its business
operations, including its ownership of YouTube, which was acquired in 2006, and
is number one video sharing website and number two most visited website).  For
further discussion of YouTube, including the fact that it is the second most visited
website after Google, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
16. See Marc Edelman, From Meerkat to Periscope, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 469,
472 (2016) (citing Christian Red, New Sports Fight: Video Streaming, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
at 47 (May 5, 2015)) (expressing fear of sports leagues). See generally Faklaris et al.,
supra note 7 (stating, in general, live streaming poses threat due to “numerous R
legal and ethical concerns around privacy and information sharing, publicity and
intellectual property”).
17. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 472 (citing Don Kaplan & Christian Red, R
Big $ucker Punch By Video Apps, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, at 17 (May 5, 2015)) (providing
quote from TV Media Insights Editor-in-Chief Marc Berman in regards to stream-
ing apps).
18. See Faklaris et al., supra note 7 (“The increasing accessibility of video and R
live streaming capability for individuals, as opposed to broadcast and cable televi-
sion networks, has long posed a threat to these revenue streams.”); see, e.g., PWC
SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 3–4 (highlighting media rights, gate revenues, R
and sponsorship).
19. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 12 (discussing focus on stream- R
ing as source to rely on for broadcasting).
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This is evident in the fact that the cost of viewing broadcasted sport-
ing events comprises approximately fifteen percent of a standard
cable bill.20  The value of broadcasting rights also presents a legal
challenge for sports leagues and broadcasters.21  Sports leagues and
broadcasters are “prime candidates for a legal battle over their in-
tellectual property rights and broadcast copyrights” against those
who rebroadcast content without permission, because leagues and
broadcasters want to ensure continued success of their businesses.22
For example, the television network NBC paid billions of dollars for
the rights to broadcast the 2014 Olympics.23  NBC expressed con-
cern it would suffer if websites and apps were able to stream events
from the Olympics without NBC’s consent.24
Against this backdrop, it is evident that live streaming technol-
ogies are changing the way consumers watch sporting events.25  Live
streaming has arguably been around since the 1990s, but it was too
difficult for most consumers to use until recently.26  It is easy for
today’s consumers to enjoy live streams because smart phones are
more sophisticated and provide access to improved data networks
with faster computing abilities.27  As a result of these technological
20. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 203 (noting sports broadcast is “dominant R
revenue stream” for leagues and percent of cable bill).
21. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 13 (suggesting increased com- R
petition across all “devices, channels and apps” could result in “significant rights
fee increase”).
22. Bryan Altman, Periscope, Meerkat Threaten Multi-Billion Dollar Sports Broadcast
Copyrights, CBS LOCAL SPORTS (Apr. 2, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.
com/2015/04/02/periscope-meerkat-threaten-multi-billion-dollar-sports-broad-
castcopyrights/ [https://perma.cc/5V58-VK43] (discussing sport broadcasters op-
posing live streaming’s technological development).
23. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 472 (citing Kaplan & Red, supra note 17) R
(reviewing potential issues from streaming).
24. See id. (cautioning forward looking ideas of live streaming abilities with
existing contracts in place).
25. See generally id. (discussing how evolving media landscape is forcing sports
industry to examine how best to broadcast events); see also Edelman, supra note 16, R
at 470–72 (discussing intellectual property rights of live streaming sporting
events).
26. See Kleinberg, supra note 3 (noting ability to record on smartphones and R
livestream via apps and internet service providers).
27. See Jeff Ward-Bailey, Live-Streaming Apps: Periscope Rises to Challenge Meerkat,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/Technol-
ogy/2015/0326/Livestreaming-apps-Periscope-rises-to-challenge-Meerkat [https:/
/perma.cc/QVT7-WWD4] (noting rise in popularity and powerful smartphones);
see also Ed Baig, Periscope Streams Challenge Meerkat, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:10
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/2015/03/26/twitter
-periscope-poses-livestreaming-challenge-to-meerkat/70469808/ [https://
perma.cc/937X-YW94] (“Only now with faster and more robust networks, power-
ful smartphones in the hands of many, and, of course, the presence of social net-
works, [live streaming] is finally gaining meaningful traction.”).
5
Bailey: Streaming Is the Name of the Game: Why Sports Leagues Should Adap
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 6 15-MAY-19 12:00
328 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26: p. 323
advancements, a larger audience is interested in live streaming con-
tent, specifically sporting events.28  This increased ease of access
presents a lucrative opportunity for the sports industry; it could sat-
isfy consumer demand by offering live streams of games.29  How-
ever, the industry is wary of live streaming and has expressed
concern because the value of broadcasted events is “inherent to
their timeliness.”30  The timeliness has to do with the fact that a live
sporting event is only important when live, otherwise consumers are
only interested in the result or outcome of the event as opposed to
watching it in real time.31  Although a live stream is as timely as a
live broadcast, leagues’ concerns focus on preventing illegal stream-
ing.32  If an event is illegally streamed or broadcasted, the result of
the event will already be known, the illegal streamer will already
have benefited from watching, and the leagues will have suffered
from fewer viewers.33  This Comment argues leagues should not be
wary, because they can use copyright law to fight parties who live
stream content without permission.34
Copyright law protects the leagues’ interests because unautho-
rized live streaming infringes and impairs the marketability and
profitability of the broadcasted coverage.35  Leagues already use
copyright law to protect their rights in the traditional broadcasting
28. See Baig, supra note 27 (noting “meaningful traction” resulting in larger R
audiences).  Consumers have also become more accustomed to watching videos on
small screens and different types of platforms. See Tali Arbel, Boxing Match Pops up
on Phones as TV Habits Change, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER (May 5, 2015) (describ-
ing transition from televisions to handheld devices).
29. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 9–10 (suggesting social media R
presents “24/7/365 opportunity to connect” and allows people to control content
consumed).
30. See Samuel Gibbs et. al., What Do Periscope and Meerkat Mean for Broadcasting
Copyright?, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2015, 6:06 AM), http://www.theguardian
.com/technology/2015/may/11/periscope-meerkat-broadcast-copyright-premier-
league [https://perma.cc/VK9L-X7ZK] (noting several professional sports leagues
have voiced caution against live streaming apps).
31. See id. (discussing importance of timeliness of games to securing viewers);
c.f. with infra notes 113–116 and accompanying text (examining results and ac- R
counts of sporting events).
32. For further discussion of an example regarding live streaming and live
broadcasting an event, see infra notes 207–218 and accompanying text. R
33. See e.g., Edelman, supra note 16, at 475 (noting loss to leagues). R
34. See id., at 475 n.31 (citing to Compl. at ¶ 38, Showtime Networks, Inc. v.
John Doe (No. 2:15-CV-03147), 2015 WL 1910767 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015)) (dis-
cussing case involving unlicensed live streaming of boxing match between Floyd
Mayweather, Jr. and Manny Pacquiao).
35. See id. (discussing Showtime Networks and how event lost value when others
infringed on event’s copyrights).
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of sporting events.36  For example, an event ticket often includes
warnings with restrictive language on the back, and broadcasts
often include similar statements about restrictions on rebroad-
casting the content without the consent of the particular league.37
A licensed broadcaster’s biggest concern is that an unlicensed party
will rebroadcast a sporting event involving “live coverage of a one-
time live sporting event whose outcome is unknown.”38
This Comment argues that even though leagues fear streaming
and seek to preserve their revenue, they should still embrace live
streaming platforms.39  If leagues live stream their sporting events,
they can engage with a rapidly developing audience through both
social media and simply by providing easy access to content, similar
to what many other television networks have done.40  Historically,
sports broadcasters provided content of any “noteworthy” event,
and sports leagues focused on “produc[ing] sports.”41  But this
model has changed.42  For example, the NFL organizes its opera-
tions and media together in order to produce coverage of its own
content.43  The NFL is able to do this by implementing its intellec-
36. For further discussion of leagues’ uses of copyright law, see infra notes
37–32, 106–142 and accompanying text. R
37. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492
(W.D. Pa. 1938) (noting language prohibiting ticket holders from sharing informa-
tion during games themselves); see also Edelman, supra note 16, at 491 (citing Red, R
supra note 16) (discussing language from NFL prohibiting retransmission). R
38. Edelman, supra note 16, at 476 n.34 (quoting Compl. at ¶ 38, supra note R
34). R
39. See Faklaris et al., supra note 7 (noting sports leagues have power under R
laws and financial motivation to block live streaming, but also have incentive to
embrace change to cater towards consumers).
40. See Sara Fischer, ESPN+ is up to a Million Paid Subscribers, AXIOS (Sept. 20,
2018), https://www.axios.com/espn-subscribers-one-million-streaming-network-
f518c532-1f38-42ff-904c-8eb990db962a.html [https://perma.cc/6NMM-HHS9]
(examining success of ESPN’s new “direct-to-consumer streaming service called
ESPN+,” suggesting future success for Disney, parent company of ESPN, which
plans to launch streaming platforms in 2019); see also Fischer, supra note 4 (report- R
ing on keeping content in-house such as Disney and AT&T’s plans to “launch new
direct-to-consumer streaming service[s]”).  Before the streaming frenzy existed,
Disney “[f]ocus[ed] on making great content and then sell[ing] it to distribution
companies, like Comcast and DirecTV.  This worked brilliantly when practically
the entire country subscribed to the same television product.”  Thompson, supra
note 1 (discussing traditional cable bundles’ success, but also that current stream- R
ing content without advertisements gives consumers reason to abandon traditional
cable bundles, leading Disney to remove its content from Netflix).
41. See Eric E. Johnson, The NFL, Intellectual Property, and the Conquest of Sports
Media, 86 N.D. L. REV. 759, 760 (2010) (examining how leagues “traditionally”
operated).
42. See id. at 760–61 (“It was up to others—the sports media—to produce
coverage on anything noteworthy that came out of the [sporting event].”).
43. See id. (pointing towards NFL as leading example of distributing informa-
tion which other leagues are likely to follow as “the blueprint”).  The NFL is a
7
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tual property rights and keeping the content for itself to dis-
tribute.44  Some entertainment companies, like Disney and Netflix,
keep their content “in-house” to maintain control over the content,
and sports leagues are questioning whether they should take the
same approach.45
After establishing a strong fan base, Netflix was able create its
own content and maintain distribution control.46  Other networks
are following suit and have begun to maintain ownership of their
content, providing access through their own in-house platforms.47
In response to the increase in the markets’ use of streaming, other
networks, websites, and apps, such as Facebook, Amazon, Twitter,
and Yahoo, have joined the streaming revolution with an eye to-
wards live streaming sporting events.48  Ultimately, this is further
proof of the demand for live streams of sporting events and the
prime example as it models itself as the “world’s leading sports business, media
and entertainment company.” Id. (quoting NFL’s 2011 internship and entry level
programs information).  Further, the NFL “controls America’s favorite sport with a
business model that is the envy of all other professional sports leagues.” Id. (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (suggesting NFL’s view of itself
goes further than outsiders’ opinions).
44. See id. (discussing how NFL keeps “not only traditional broadcasting game
coverage” for itself, but also “all elements used by journalists to report on sports,”
such as audio and video coverage, and in game updates).
45. See Sara Fischer, AT&T to Launch a Netflix Competitor Late 2019, AXIOS
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.axios.com/att-launch-new-streaming-service-in-late-
2019-06574ea7-5ed6-4b38-9323-f7cf9ea7bd34.html [https://perma.cc/R8KW-
LQJ2] (explaining new plans for “direct to consumer” streaming); see also Fischer,
supra note 4 (stating “Netflix and Amazon currently lead the pack,” but pointing R
out AT&T and Disney’s plans to provide streaming content in near future); Karl
Bode, The Rise of Netflix Competitors Has Pushed Consumers Back Toward Piracy,
MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 2, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ar-
ticle/d3q45v/bittorrent-usage-increases-netflix-streaming-sites?utm_source=reddit.
com [https://perma.cc/JP8M-RFBY] (discussing Disney’s decision to remove its
content from Netflix and begin its own streaming service).  “Studies have shown
that nearly every major broadcaster will have launched their own streaming service
by 2022.  And these companies are increasingly choosing to keep their own content as
in-house exclusives in order to drive subscriptions.” Id. (emphasis added) (sug-
gesting moving content in-house makes sense to drive up subscribers when content
is better and exclusive).  For further discussion of sports leagues’ decision on
streaming content, see infra notes 187–285. R
46. See Fischer, supra note 4 (examining Netflix’s subscription video service). R
For further discussion of Netflix, see supra notes 7–10, 40, and 45 and accompany- R
ing text.
47. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 40 (reporting on Disney’s interest in control- R
ling its platform, including its subsidiary ESPN+).  For further discussion of other
similar streaming platforms, see supra notes 7–10, 40, and 45 and accompanying R
text.
48. For further discussion of these non-traditional broadcasting companies’
opportunities, see supra notes 13–15, infra notes 199–201, 240–243 and accompa- R
nying text.
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wide audience sports leagues could reach if they allowed these sites
to stream their content.49
Prior to discussing how live streaming is changing the con-
sumption of sporting events, it is necessary to discuss the history of
sports broadcasting and how leagues have handled broadcasting is-
sues in the past.50  This Comment addresses the history to predict
how leagues will likely react to current live streaming disputes and
how leagues should react to such disputes.51  The history of sports
broadcasting shows how coverage of sporting events has developed
to where it is now and conclusively suggests the direction it may
continue to move towards—a direction focusing on the consumers
and easy access to content.52  Section II of this Comment provides
background on the development of live streaming.53  Section II also
examines major intellectual property legislation through the Sports
Broadcasting Act and copyright law.54  Section III of this Comment
analyzes the most significant trends in live streaming, including
how consumers are protected under specific policies.55  Section III
also looks at boxing which has embraced streaming to air content
as well as lessons from the sport’s past issues.56  Ultimately, Section
IV of this Comment argues that leagues should embrace live
streaming because it helps them engage directly with consumers via
internet providers, mobile devices, apps, and easy access to
content.57
49. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 12 (reporting next generation R
of consumer demands focuses on “tech giants”).
50. For further discussion of the development of sports broadcasting, see infra
notes 58–105 and accompanying text. R
51. For further discussion of changes in coverage of sporting events and the
development of sports broadcasting, see supra notes 10–45 and infra notes 58–155 R
and accompanying text.
52. For further discussion of sports broadcasting development, see infra notes
58–79 and accompanying text. R
53. For further discussion of the background of streaming, see infra notes
58–79 and accompanying text. R
54. For further discussion of sports broadcasting law and other legislation
protecting such content, see infra notes 80–157 and accompanying text. R
55. For further discussion of trends in live streaming and consumers’ protec-
tion, see infra notes 160–198 and accompanying text. R
56. For further discussion of sports broadcasting trends, see infra notes
160–286 and accompanying text. R
57. For further discussion of how leagues should react, see infra notes
287–300 and accompanying text. R
9
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II. BACKGROUND: EXPLAINING LEAGUES’ HESITANCIES TO CHANGE
THROUGH ANTITRUST LAWS, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
To understand how streaming has developed in the sports in-
dustry, it is helpful to explore prior protective actions leagues have
taken to control the availability of their content on different net-
works.58  Sports coverage has existed throughout modern history.59
Technological developments, including the introductions of the ra-
dio and television, have boosted consumer and advertiser interests
in sports.60  In the late twentieth century, technological innovations
prompted changes in legislation and caselaw, pushing broadcasting
towards its current form.61  As a result of these technological ad-
vancements, broadcast networks are willing to pay increasing
amounts to claim the exclusive rights to air sporting events, thereby
boosting leagues’ revenue.62  For example, the NFL entered into
agreements with CBS, Fox, NBC, and ESPN from 2014 to 2022 for
nearly forty billion dollars.63  The National Basketball Association
(“NBA”) agreed to contracts with ESPN and TNT from 2016 to
58. See generally Edelman, supra note 16, at 470–77 (addressing history of live R
streaming technology); see also Mathews, supra note 1, at 203–209 (discussing his- R
tory of sports broadcasting rights).
59. See Corey Nachman & Dashiell Bennett, 14 Innovations That Changed Sports
Broadcasting Forever, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 17. 2011, 4:26 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/evolution-how-we-watch-sports-2011-4 [https://
perma.cc/6E38-Z7FW] (describing history of sports coverage beginning with wide-
spread radio broadcasts in 1920s, baseball coming to television in 1939, and sports
programming in color in 1955).
60. See Jeremy M. Evans, We Have Come Full Circle: Where Sports Franchises Derive
Their Revenue, 33 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 12 (2017) (discussing broadcasting revenue
for sports and noting television was invented in 1920s but larger television con-
tracts began in 2000s).  For further discussion of advertisers’ interests, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text. R
61. For further discussion of historical advancement in technology and sports
broadcasting, see supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. R
62. See Evans, supra note 60, at 12–13 (reviewing revenue sources from broad- R
casting deals).
63. See Nitin Bhandari, Top 10 Largest Sports League TV Contracts Ever, THE
RICHEST (Nov. 23, 2013), https://www.therichest.com/sports/the-largest-sports-
league-tv-contracts-ever/ [https://perma.cc/A2CY-XJPV] (noting for 2014, Fox’s
NFL contract worth $1.1 billion per year, CBS’s NFL contract worth $1 billion per
year, and NBC’s NFL contract worth $950 million per year); cf. Top 10 Biggest TV
Rights Deals in Sports ,  TOTAL SPORTEK (Jan. 19, 2017), https://
www.totalsportek.com/money/biggest-tv-deals-sports/ [https://perma.cc/M732-
6DY9] (depicting total worth of NFL’s broadcasting deals as $39.6 billion).  Nota-
bly, the NFL’s largest contract appears to be ESPN’s deal to air Monday Night
Football, which is worth $1.9 billion per year. See Bhandari, supra note 63 (point- R
ing out largest sports broadcasting contract).
10
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2025 for twenty-four billion dollars.64  The MLB signed a deal with
Fox, TBS, and ESPN from 2014 to 2022 for just over twelve billion
dollars.65  The revenue from these contracts is split among the
franchises in each league.66  These contracts also depict the larger
deals within the respective sports leagues, which do not include the
many regional and local television station contracts that also broad-
cast games.67  The revenue generated from broadcasting deals is ex-
pected to increase as “internet television outlets” like Netflix,
YouTube, and even Twitter and Facebook, begin to broadcast sport-
ing events.68  Streaming live sports through different mediums
presents an opportunity to reach more viewers, which is important
for advertisers.69  In 2015, the NFL took advantage of this opportu-
nity when it streamed its first game accessible solely through the
internet on Yahoo.70
64. See Bhandari, supra note 63 (noting Disney, parent company of ESPN and R
ABC, deal with NBA for $485 million per year, and TNT’s deal with NBA for $445
million per year); cf. TOTAL SPORTEK, supra note 63 (stating NBA’s total broadcast- R
ing deal worth $24 billion).
65. See Bhandari, supra note 63 (providing Fox’s deal with MLB for $500 mil- R
lion per year); cf. TOTAL SPORTEK, supra note 63 (stating MLB’s total broadcasting R
deals with Fox, TBS, and ESPN amount to $12.4 billion).
66. See Evans, supra note 60 (highlighting interest each franchise has in such R
contracts).  Compare the amounts of these contracts with the fact the NFL gener-
ates about $14 billion per year. See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Revenue Reaches $14B, Fueled
By Media, SPORTS BUS. J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
Journal/Issues/2017/03/06/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NFL-revenue.aspx
[https://perma.cc/76FH-QP89] (reporting $900 million increase compared to
2016 mostly due to media presence); see also Stephen J. Dubner, How Sports Became
Us, FREAKONOMICS RADIO (Sept. 12, 2018), available at http://freakonomics.com/
podcast/sports-ep-1/ [https://perma.cc/S7DS-DJFL] (discussing NFL’s revenue
with Victor Matheson, who states NFL generates $14 to $15 billion per year).
67. See Evans, supra note 60 (detailing one MLB team, Los Angeles Dodgers, R
has $8.3 billion contract to air games over twenty-five-year period with Time
Warner Cable).  Regional and local broadcast coverage is successful because “re-
gional sports networks are money-printing operations that heavily promote the
teams they carry and play on the loyalties and wallets of local fans.”  Richard
Sandomir, Regional Sports Networks Show the Money, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/sports/regional-sports-networks-show-
teams-the-money.html [https://perma.cc/R4CW-ARWQ] (indicating large pres-
ence of local television station contracts).
68. See Evans, supra note 60 (stating “revenues will likely only grow” as stream- R
ing services get involved).  As more consumers prefer to watch sporting events live,
and streaming is becoming more accessible, “live sports telecast has become in-
creasingly valuable real estate for advertisers desperate for eyeballs.”  Kaufman,
supra note 3 (noting absence of commercial-free options). R
69. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing NFL’s streaming R
partnership with Amazon as “giv[ing] TV providers an opportunity to generate
incremental advertising dollars through these partnerships”).
70. For further discussion of the NFL’s first streamed game, see infra note 244 R
and accompanying text.
11
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The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (“SBA”) is the best place
to start in an examination of the advancements in streaming
sports.71  Sports broadcasting law has been fairly unchanged since
Congress enacted the SBA because it provides immunity for leagues
from federal antitrust broadcasting regulations.72  In recent years,
leagues have faced suits regarding broadcast agreements focusing
on blackout restrictions, or actions banning events from airing in
particular markets due to league broadcasting contracts with local
markets.73
Blackout restrictions have led some consumers to pirate or ille-
gally stream sporting events.74  At the same time, sports leagues are
opening the door to streaming more content, given the leagues are
the ones providing the content.75  Leagues should not be hesitant
to provide streaming content because the SBA gives them the up-
per hand in distributing and controlling content.76  Further, the
71. See generally Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87–331, 75 Stat.
732 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2006)).  For further discus-
sion of the importance of the SBA, advancements in sports broadcasting, and how
it developed, see infra notes 80–105 and accompanying text. R
72. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 203 (focusing on four major American pro- R
fessional sports leagues: football, hockey, basketball, and baseball).
73. See id. (noting league’s “agreements were alleged to be in violation of fed-
eral antitrust laws” as restrictions limited viewers and increased price); see generally
Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (reviewing
blackout restriction case for NHL, holding plaintiffs adequately alleged participa-
tion of conspiracy to geographically divide market, but failed to state claim for
conspiracy to monopolize market for video presentation and internet streaming of
games); Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (reviewing blackout restriction case for MLB); Trilogy Holding v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League, Inc., 2:15CV10000 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reviewing blackout restriction
case for NFL); William F. Saldutti IV, Blocking Home: Major League Baseball Settles
Blackout Restriction Case; However, a Collision with Antitrust Laws is Still Inevitable, 24
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 49 (2017) (examining blackout restrictions in
MLB).
74. See generally Erik Malinowski, WTF MLB? Baseball Strikes Out with its Stream-
ing Policies, ROLLING STONE (Jun. 5, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/ sports/
features/wtf-mlb-baseball-strikes-out-with-its-streaming-policies-20150605 [https://
perma.cc/8HJH-R3LS] (discussing use of proxy websites to mask where content is
viewed); Bode, supra note 45 (reviewing why consumers pirate content in general, R
because, “an increase in exclusivity deals [ ] force subscribers to hunt and peck
among a myriad of streaming services to actually find the content they’re looking
for”).
75. See generally Mathews, supra note 1 (reviewing streaming in sports); see also R
Stephen W. Dittmore & Brett Hutchins, Privilege Over Innovation: Sports Broadcast-
ing, Mobile Television, and the Case of Aereo, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 3 (2017)
(examining abilities of streaming apps to share sports leagues’ content).  For fur-
ther discussion of significance of maintaining distribution of content, see supra
notes 40–47 and accompanying text. R
76. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 6–8 (analyzing streaming apps R
under Copyright Act of 1976 and who has control of streamed content).
12
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Copyright Act of 1976 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
bolster the protection leagues receive from the SBA.77  Leagues
have struggled with how to best approach issues of streaming given
their legal abilities to restrict consumers’ access to content com-
pared to the increase in availability to stream content and consum-
ers’ demands.78  The major debate underlying changes in sports
broadcasting is the antitrust law which seeks to “prevent monopo-
lies,” versus the intellectual property and copyright laws which seek
to “enshrine” monopolies.79
A. Sports Broadcasting Act: Package and Monopolize
The SBA created the cable television bundle currently domi-
nating broadcasts of professional sports.80  The SBA was enacted in
response to contract disputes between the NFL, the American Foot-
ball League (“AFL”), and separate broadcasting stations.81  Specifi-
cally, the SBA was formed in response to two lawsuits against the
NFL in which the respective courts held the sale of packaged tele-
vised games to CBS violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.82
1. The 1953 and 1961 Cases
In United States v. National Football League,83 the first lawsuit in
1953 (hereinafter “the 1953 case”), a dispute arose over the NFL’s
77. See id. (discussing Copyright Act of 1976).  For further discussion of
streaming services’ abilities under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see infra
notes 148–149 and accompanying text. R
78. For further discussion of the leagues’ dilemma with approaching stream-
ing, see supra notes 16–45 and accompanying text. R
79. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 761–62 (noting surprise sports leagues took R
so long to embrace intellectual property rights, because “it has always been a fore-
gone conclusion that, as a business, sports would run headlong into antitrust is-
sues”).  Sports leagues are now more focused on intellectual property law since it
provides a “sanctioned escape” from antitrust law. See id. (“The legal concepts of
antitrust and [intellectual property] are each other’s yin and yang.”).
80. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 6 (referring to congressmen R
reflecting on impact of SBA).
81. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 12 (“The AFL-NFL merger R
wouldn’t have happened if the AFL had not secured a broadcast deal with NBC
. . . .”).
82. See generally Steven Perry, Home Run or Strikeout? The Unsettled Relationship
Between the Sports Broadcasting Act and Cable Programming, 25 No. 2 COMPETITION: J.
ANTI., UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. B. CAL. 20, 21, available at https://www.mto.com/
Templates/media/files/Reprints/Steve%20Perry/
Home%20Run%20or%20Strikeout_Article_Fall%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GYB9-QUA3] (referring to AFL and NFL dispute of packaged deals).
83. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
13
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newly proposed bylaws.84  The issue revolved around what are now
known as “blackout restrictions.”85  After the 1953 case, each NFL
team entered into agreements with networks for television rights.86
Prior to the second case in 1961, the NFL entered into a contract
with CBS, and the AFL signed a five-year contract with ABC to air
all league games.87  In 1961, in United States v. National Football
League,88 the second suit of the same name (hereinafter “the 1961
case”), a district court ruled the NFL’s attempt to package broad-
casting rights to CBS violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.89  In the 1961 case, the NFL asked the district court from the
1953 case to allow the league’s proposed agreement with CBS, but
the court declined to do so.90  The court held the NFL teams “elim-
inated competition among themselves in the sale of television
rights, in violation of a provision in the final judgment that barred
restrictions.”91
2. Enactment of the SBA
A few months after the 1961 case, Congress enacted the SBA.92
The SBA allows a sports league to control all copyrighted broadcast-
ing under the particular league’s name.93  The purpose of the SBA
84. See generally id. at 327–39 (detailing new bylaws for broadcasting games);
see also Perry, supra note 82, at 21–23 (discussing 1953 case). R
85. See Perry, supra note 82, at 23 n.20 (referring to how Congress’s “final R
judgment [ ] allow[ed] restrictions on the telecasts of games in the home territory
of a team that was playing at home that day”).
86. See id. (discussing result of 1953 case).
87. See id. (noting AFL later merged with NFL).
88. 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
89. See id. at 447 (reviewing NFL’s broadcasting plan with CBS).
90. See id. (addressing discrepancy between two leagues and what each league
was capable of).
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Nat’l
Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961)).
92. See generally United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (pub-
lishing opinion on July 20, 1961); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (being originally
enacted on Sept. 30, 1961).  Once the SBA was enacted, leagues were able to ob-
tain control over the distribution of their sporting events, and the individual
teams, clubs, and organizations “agreed not to compete in business matters related
to the video presentation of live major-league . . . games.”  Laumann v. Nat’l
Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Compl. at ¶
5[7], Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d (No. 1:12-CV-01817), and Compl. at ¶ 8, Garber v.
Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 1:12-
CV-0374)).
93. See Eric Gebert, The Long Arm of the National Football League: Is the NFL’s
Copyright Policy Violating the Rights of Its Fans and Franchises?, B.C. IP & TECH. FORUM,
at 7 (2017), available at http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Blog-
The-Long-Arm-of-the-National-Football-League-Gebert.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2MVF-J34Q] (citing Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Roundtable on Com-
14
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is to avoid antitrust laws, and it accomplishes this by allowing teams
within sports leagues to combine their rights.94  Combining
leagues’ rights results in telecasting games in a “package of pooled
rights to a television network or other purchaser without thereby
violating the antitrust laws.”95  The sporting leagues then use their
market power through the antitrust exemption to package broad-
cast deals.96  Notably, the AFL operated under this setup already,
yet the 1953 case prohibited the NFL from doing so, which eventu-
ally prompted the 1961 case.97
3. Function of the SBA Today
Sports leagues urged Congress to enact the SBA because it
would allow “the leagues to stay financially solvent amid technologi-
cal innovation that permitted teams in larger markets to realize
more broadcasting revenue than teams in smaller media mar-
kets.”98  Since its enactment, courts have held the SBA applies
strictly to free commercial television and not to contracts with paid-
for television.99  “Free commercial television” includes networks
petition and Sports, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1, 8. (June 8, 2010)); see also Johnson, supra
note 41, at 773 (noting antitrust exemption to sports leagues allows leagues to pool R
broadcast rights as one package).
94. See 108 Cong. Rec. at 20059–60 (1961), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1961-pt15/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1961-
pt15-4-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F77L-HLPT] (discussing bill to amend antitrust
laws to allow leagues to enter into television contracts).
95. Id. at 20059 (quoting Rep. Cellar).
96. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 4 (discussing leagues’ strong R
market control).
97. See Perry, supra note 82, at 23 (reviewing NFL’s proposal to ask for judicial R
permission to contract with CBS in 1961). In a discussion on Congress’s intent and
this issue in 1961, one representative was quoted as saying:
[T]he members of a professional sports league cannot lawfully act in con-
cert to assure member clubs with weak teams or limited home territory
television markets an adequate amount of television income and of televi-
sion coverage for games played away from home.  Yet, should these
weaker teams be allowed to f[l]ounder, there is danger that the structure
of the entire league would become impaired and its continued existence
imperiled.
108 Cong. Rec. at 20060 (referring to Rep. Cellar’s discussion on how H.R. 9096 is
needed to supersede the 1953 and 1961 cases).
98. Dittmore & Hutchins supra note 75, at 11 (noting lobbyist attempts in R
Congress).
99. See Perry, supra note 82, at 20–21, 28–30 (relying on Chicago Prof’l Sports R
Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) and Shaw v. Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999)).  Specifically, the Shaw
case on remand interpreted that the Court of Appeals “did not address whether
broadcasting the games on the Internet or cable television was an exempt activity
under the SBA, but only found that satellite broadcasts of NFL games were not ex-
empted.”  Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561, 577
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (first emphasis added) (discussing narrower approach contrary to
15
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like NBC and CBS, whereas paid-for television includes networks
like TNT and ESPN.100  Sports leagues may decide “to move their
content to pay cable distributors,” but the leagues would lose their
exemption from antitrust laws under the SBA.101
Even with all of the legislation surrounding the SBA, only a
small number of courts have examined whether sports broadcasting
agreements with a league are exempt from antitrust laws under the
SBA.102  However, statutory interpretation does suggest the SBA ex-
emptions apply to basic programming specifically.103  Currently,
due to antitrust exemptions, leagues are able to negotiate as a
whole rather than through individual teams and organizations.104
Ultimately, the SBA highlights the old-school style of leagues re-
sisting change: package a deal and control the market.105
B. Copyright Act of 1976: Protect and Collect
1. Enactment of the Copyright Act
While the SBA gave leagues the ability to negotiate deals, the
Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter “the Copyright Act”) provided
protection in the form of licensing for certain forms of media and
broad interpretation of current parties, and noting Charles Shaw’s dismissal as
class representative, replaced by Bret D. Schwartz).
100. For further discussion of paid-for television, see infra notes 103, 132–136, R
and accompanying text.
101. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 14 (expressing leagues’ inter- R
ests in preventing live streaming apps to keep antitrust status).
102. See Perry, supra note 82, at 20 (“[C]ontrary to what various commentators R
have assumed, no court has ever held that leaguewide agreements that license
sports programming on basic cable channels are, or are not, exempt from the
antitrust laws under the SBA.”).
103. See id. at 20, 23–28 (relying on statutory interpretation in Chi. Prof’l
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 808 F. Supp 646 (N.D. Ill. 1992)).
“Since antitrust exemptions must be characterized narrowly, we conclude that
TNT, like ESPN, falls outside the statutory meaning of ‘sponsored telecasting.’”
Chi. Prof’l Sports, 808 F. Supp. at 650 (reviewing historical interpretation of SBA’s
intent of “sponsored telecasting” in 1961 and determining it referred to free televi-
sion, which TNT is not).  “While telecasting on TNT may be considered sponsored
telecasting because TNT does receive some revenues from advertising in addition
to subscription fees, pure subscription or pay-per-view telecasts clearly are not con-
sidered sponsored telecasting.”  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n, 874 F. Supp. 844, 856 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citation omitted) (discussing
how SBA only applies to agreements regarding “sponsored telecasting”), vacated,
95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
104. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 764 (discussing NFL’s ability to negotiate R
as whole under the SBA and 15 U.S.C. § 1291, et seq. (2006)).
105. For further discussion of the SBA’s application, see supra notes 80–104 R
and accompanying text.
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produced works, including sports broadcasting rights.106  Surpris-
ingly, many leagues did not utilize the Copyright Act right away,
most likely because of their antitrust exemption and because it is
unnecessary to file a copyright to ensure protection of  one’s work
from individuals illegally copying and reproducing material.107
The Copyright Act is the basis for most copyright claims, and its text
“ma[kes] specific reference to simultaneously recorded transmis-
sions of live sporting events being ‘fixed’” and copyrightable.108
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”109  Moreover, the
Copyright Act provides “copyright owners the exclusive right to per-
form or license the performance of copyrighted works publicly.”110
Ultimately, the Copyright Act is meant to ensure fair protection and
return, typically monetary value through licensing or royalties, for a
creative work.111
106. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (providing forms of media and pro-
duced works).  For further discussion of enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, see
infra notes 108–142 and accompanying text. R
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (detailing uncopyrighted material is still protected).
For further discussion of protecting practices of copyrighted work, see infra note
122 and accompanying text. R
108. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (illustrating copyright law); see also Nat’l Bas-
ketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing history
of copyright disputes centered on Copyright Act).  Notably, the Copyright Act of
1976 is an amendment that overturned two Supreme Court cases, Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) and Teleprompter
Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). See Am. Broad. Co., Inc.
v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 437–43 (2014) (detailing Congress’ intent of enacting
Copyright Act of 1976 and specific changes made).  The 1976 amendments re-
sulted in three main changes: (1) determining both broadcasters and viewers
“‘perform,’ because they both show the program’s images and make audible the
programs sounds”; (2) enacting the Transmit Clause, which depicts when an entity
performs publicly; and, (3) “regulat[ing] cable companies’ public performances of copy-
righted works,” including detailing complex licensing scheme and fees. Id. (empha-
sis added). Further, according to the court in Aereo: “Congress made these three
changes to achieve a similar end: to bring the activities of cable systems within the
scope of the Copyright Act.” Id.  For further discussion of the Transmit Clause, see
infra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. R
109. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added) (portraying works protected under
copyright law).
110. Dittmore & Hutchins supra note 75, at 6 (describing specifically Section R
106 of 1976 Act).
111. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (allowing authors and inventors exclusive right to their work under United
States Constitution).  Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states
Congress has the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
17
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2. Examples of the Copyright Act’s Protections
Providing real accounts of a live game without authorization of
a league does not violate the Copyright Act.112  Specifically, in Na-
tional Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.,113 the Second Circuit held the
Copyright Act does not protect the actual NBA basketball games or
the source of the information created during the games, such as the
statistics and results.114  The Second Circuit reasoned athletic
events and performances do not constitute original works under
the Copyright Act.115  Sporting events themselves are not original
works of authorship, because the sporting event is competitive with
“no underlying script.”116  Broadcasting, on the other hand, is an
original authorship which is fixed via video recording.117  Congress
made this distinction clear when it determined authorship includes
a sporting event covered with multiple cameras, “with a director
guiding the activities of the [ ] cameramen and choosing which of
their electronic images are sent to the public and in what order.”118
Other examples of protected work under the Copyright Act include
literary, musical, and dramatic works, as well as pantomimes, chore-
ography, pictorial works, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, sound recordings, and architecture.119  This list is not ex-
haustive, nor is the protection boundless, because “the Copyright
112. See Matthew J. Mitten, A Triple Play for the Public Domain: Delaware Lottery to
Motorola to C.B.C., 11 CHAP. L. REV. 569, 571 (2008) (citing Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
at 847) (referring to information created by sporting events not protected under
copyright law).
113. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
114. See id. at 845 (pointing out accounts and results of event).
115. See id. (distinguishing original works).
116. See id. at 846–47 (explaining why sports are not original works of author-
ship but broadcasted coverage is); see also Edelman, supra note 16, at 481 (“A sport- R
ing event in itself does not generally constitute an ‘original work of authorship’
because sporting events ‘are competitive and have no underlying script.’” (quoting
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d at 846)).
117. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 479 (“Generally, there is little doubt that R
televised broadcasts of traditional sporting events constitute ‘original works of au-
thorship’ because the camera angles chosen for the broadcast and the manner of
game announcing both entail at least ‘a modicum of creativity.’” (quoting Feist
Publn’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)).
118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) (describing how football games are
covered by four cameras with resulting broadcast representing authorship); see also
Feist Publn’s, Inc., 499 U.S. at 346 (explaining “originality requires independent
creation plus a modicum of creativity” including camera angles chosen and sports
reporting).
119. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing examples).
18
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Act allows courts sufficient flexibility to protect other types of
works.”120
3. Additional Legislation and Ongoing Challenges Under the Copyright
Act
The NFL appears to have begun “requir[ing] a copyright as-
signment as part of a telecast deal” in 1983 with the Copyright Of-
fice.121  Notably, registration is considered good practice but is not
required to maintain copyright ownership, although today the NFL
consistently files copyrights.122  Many sports leagues, including the
NFL,  provide warnings via announcements to notify listeners and
viewers they are prohibited from retransmitting or reproducing
copyrighted material.123  The Copyright Act defines “transmit” as
communication by a “device or process whereby images or sounds
are received beyond the place from where they are sent.”124  Con-
gress added the Transmit Clause to the Copyright Act to emphasize
that when an entity provides coverage of an event, the public re-
ceives a transmission of the event.125
The Copyright Act also led to additional legislation to regulate
transmissions, costs, and competition among providers.126  For ex-
ample, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 requires programming distributors, such as Verizon or
AT&T through DirecTV, to obtain permission from broadcasters
like ABC and CBS before they can carry the broadcaster’s pro-
120. Edelman, supra note 16, at 478 n.52 (internal quotation marks omitted) R
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52) (discussing how list exemplifies what bill is
intended to protect, but list is not exhaustive).
121. Johnson, supra note 41, at 764–65 (noting copyright records before 1978 R
were not available in electronic database, but “starting in 1983, Copyright Office
records reflect increasing registrations for television game coverage”).
122. See id. at 765 (pointing out NFL had twelve games registered in 1983, but
“now has a consistent practice of registering each and every game telecast”); see also
17 U.S.C. § 106 (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”).
123. See Kirk Biglione, Warning: Those Copyright Warnings May Not Be Entirely
Accurate, MEDIALOPER (Aug. 2, 2007), http://medialoper.com/warning-those-copy-
right-warnings-may-not-be-entirely-accurate/ [https://perma.cc/2QX6-69XN] (re-
porting specifically on NFL and MLB, and providing example of warnings: “This
copyrighted telecast is presented by authority of the Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball.  It may not be reproduced or retransmitted in any form, and the ac-
counts and descriptions of this game may not be disseminated without express
written consent”).
124. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (referring to what is known as Transmit Clause).
125. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 8 (indicating importance of R
defining transmission).
126. For further discussion of examples of issues covered by additional legisla-
tion, see infra notes 127–131 and accompanying text. R
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gram.127  Programming distributors could include broadcasters
under a “Must Carry” rule, thereby requiring a distributor with a
certain number of “channels [to] set aside one-third of their chan-
nel capacity for local, free-to-air broadcasters.”128  If the broadcast-
ers permit distributors to share their programming, it is known as
“retransmission consent” or “carriage fees.”129  Retransmission fees
for sporting events are extremely expensive because of the large
audience and competition to obtain the rights.130  A 2012 example
details this process:
Sunbeam Television Corporation operates WHDH, the
NBC affiliate in Boston.  On January 14, 2012, Sunbeam
denied DirecTV access to its signal after DirecTV refused
to pay a 300% increase in retransmission fees.  The timing
of the blackout occurred before popular NFL divisional
playoff games.  The dispute was settled on January 27, one
week before the New England Patriots played in Super
Bowl 46, a game for which NBC had broadcast rights.131
Currently, broadcast networks such as NBC, ABC, and CBS bid
on rights to obtain exclusive content for sporting events.132  Profes-
sional sports leagues have threatened to broadcast events on paid
cable networks, including networks like ESPN and TNT, in order to
avoid copyright infringements and make it more difficult to copy
content on free-to-air broadcasters.133  Many sporting events “have
127. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 8 (introducing retransmission R
fees and how video programming distributors developed their network).
128. Id. at 8–9 (noting in 1992 “some 40% of U.S. households relied on free-
to-air broadcasters”).
129. See id. at 9 (introducing terminology from course of business with
distributors).
130. See id. (discussing how debate of consent for retransmission is often cen-
tered around live sports content).
131. Id. (providing example of retransmission fees and debates of retransmis-
sion consent).
132. See id. at 9–10 (introducing existing business models currently used by
television networks with sports leagues); see also Cecilia Kang, Bidding War Between
Networks, Sports Leagues Will Increase Price of Cable TV, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bidding-war-between-net
works-sports-leagues-will-increase-price-of-cable-tv/2015/01/23/d0cb19f4-9db8-
11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html?utm_term=.feff5aed61bd [https://perma.cc/
M2A5-VHMC] (reporting on networks like CBS, Fox, and TNT, bidding to air
events on their stations, resulting in increased prices due to “the growing number
of sports channels all bidding for the right to air popular events”).
133. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 11 (suggesting major sporting R
events would be made more restrictive on paid for networks because streaming
services “cannot hijack and exploit their programming without authorization”
(quoting Brief of Nat’l Football League and Major League Baseball as Amici Cu-
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already moved to national and regional cable sports net[works],”
but if courts rule against leagues in cases involving allegations of
illegal streaming of events, leagues will “stampede” to paid-for net-
works.134  However, if all sports move to paid cable networks, news
outlets speculate this could lead to the “end of sports on free
TV.”135  At the same time, many consumers are dropping cable bun-
dles such as ESPN, which “lost an average of 10,400 subscribers a
day between February 2016 and May 2016.”136
One example of a recent case where the Supreme Court began
addressing this issue is American Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo, Inc.137  In
Aereo, the Supreme Court sided with two sports leagues, the NFL
and MLB, after the lower courts held for Aereo, a streaming service
app.138  The NFL and MLB argued the foundation of Aereo’s busi-
ness model takes broadcast retransmission rights and gives them to
“unlicensed commercial strangers that inefficiently engineer distri-
bution systems to avoid copyright liability”—a direct violation of the
Copyright Act.139  The Court defended the two leagues’ abilities to
prevent Aereo from providing sporting event content under free-to-
air broadcasters, such as ABC, the party that initiated the suit.140
The Aereo case highlights the central issue today’s sports leagues
and broadcasters face with illegal streaming: anyone may obtain ac-
cess to the transmission and may thereby infringe on broadcasters’
copyrights.141  Sports leagues are protected under the Copyright
riae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431
(2013) (No. 13-461))).
134. John Eggerton, Leagues to Supremes: Aereo “Package” Is Game Breaker,
BROAD. CABLE (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/ wash-
ington/leagues-supremes-aereo-package-game-breaker/129702 [https://
perma.cc/SD54-FT2K] (discussing leagues’ opposition to streaming service
Aereo); see also Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 11 (reviewing cost perspec- R
tive of transmission from free-to-air and pay television networks).
135. See, e.g., Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 11 (providing news head- R
lines from CNN “NFL and MLB: Aereo May Kill Sports on Free TV”).
136. Id. at 14 (suggesting leagues may not actually want to produce content
on broadcast networks).  For further discussion of ESPN’s loss in subscribers, see
infra note 232 and accompanying text. R
137. 573 U.S. 431 (2014).
138. See generally id. (focusing on NFL’s and MLB’s Copyright Act complaint).
139. See Brief of Nat’l Football League and Major League Baseball in Am.
Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) (attempting to preserve
existing business model and support retransmission fees) rev’d and remanded sub
nom. 573 U.S. 431 (2014).
140. See Aereo, 573 U.S. at 450–51 (holding for professional sports leagues be-
cause Aereo’s conduct was within scope of Copyright Act, infringing on sports
leagues’ rights).
141. See generally Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 6–11 (detailing de- R
bate with Aereo and sports broadcasting).
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Act, but if illegal streaming increases, the leagues fail to collect
from potential viewers.142
C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Digitize and Stream
The need for new legislation arose as the internet grew into a
platform for media and telecom conglomerates to share and pro-
duce content.143  As a result, Congress passed the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998.144  The DMCA provided a
“compromise between copyright owners and digital content provid-
ers” by allowing sports leagues to instruct any party sharing copy-
righted material to remove the content.145  The DMCA criminalizes
the production of devices and services intended to share copy-
righted material.146  It also enumerates the rights of owners of copy-
righted material and explains how the owners may proceed when
they believe their rights have “been infringed, particularly but not
limited to, on the Internet.”147
Title II of the DMCA, separately titled the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act, protects internet service
providers from liability if they follow “safe harbor guidelines and
promptly block access to alleged infringing material.”148  Under Ti-
tle II, internet service providers must remove copyrighted material
when a copyright holder notifies the provider of an infringe-
142. For discussion of leagues’ protections under the Copyright Act, see supra
notes 106–141 and accompanying text. R
143. For further discussion of new legislation focusing on internet services,
see infra notes 145–155 and accompanying text. R
144. See generally DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); see also
U.S. Copyright Office, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright
Office Summary, 1, (1998) available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/
dmca.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD3K-SZ6E] (noting date of Act and laying out how
DMCA amended Title 17 of United States Code).
145. Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States, 21
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236, 237 (1999) (describing NFL’s use of removing
content).
146. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 144, at 1 (discussing criminal as- R
pects of act).
147. What Is DMCA?, DMCA.COM, https://www.dmca.com/faq/What-is-
DMCA [https://perma.cc/AE72-WK2L] (last updated Apr. 20, 2017) (addressing
obligations and protections).
148. Andrew Rissler, Fair Use of Foul Balls: Major League Baseball Advanced Media
and its Counterproductive Takedown Notices to Fans, 27 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 133, 135
(2016) (describing internet service providers’ duty and rights); see also Online Cop-
yright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010)) (discussing and analyzing DMCA
generally).
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ment.149  Importantly, under Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc.,150 internet service providers are not liable when their users ille-
gally post copyrighted material.151  In Viacom, the court found You-
Tube had not encouraged users to share copyrighted material, and
it ruled similar internet service providers “have no duty to monitor
their websites for infringing content posted by their users.”152
The Viacom court based its holding on a provision of Title II
requiring the internet service provider to receive immunity as long
as it meets three criteria.153  The provider must: (1) not have actual
knowledge the material is infringing; (2) not receive financial bene-
fit from the infringed activity; and, (3) remove material “expedi-
tiously” upon notification.154  Notably, the Copyright Act of 1976
“eliminated the requirement of notice on the part of the copyright
holder, and there is no requirement in the DMCA to issue a take-
down notice for every violation to maintain a copyright.”155  At bot-
tom, Viacom suggests leagues may be hesitant to provide live
streaming content because internet service providers do not need
to monitor for users sharing pirated content.156  However, such
concern could be misguided, as DMCA provides the same protec-
tion as the Copyright Act, except on the same digital medium
where streaming platforms are found.157  As such, and as the next
Section discusses in greater detail, leagues need not fear streaming
and the threat of piracy.158  Congress and the Court have given
149. See Rissler, supra note 148, at 135 (noting safe harbor provision also in- R
cludes counter provision for internet service providers when user claims material is
not infringing); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (discussing liability).
150. 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
151. See id. at 121 (reasoning provider cannot be liable without prior knowl-
edge of violation).
152. Id. (determining YouTube did not have intent to share infringed mate-
rial); see also Rissler supra note 148, at 136 (discussing duty to monitor for infring- R
ing material).
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (requiring, generally, no actual knowledge, no finan-
cial benefit, and removal of material); see also Rissler supra note 148, 136–37 (con- R
sidering importance of internet service provider having actual knowledge of
material infringing on copyright and how service providers lose immunity under
§ 512).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (listing requirements for immunity).
155. Rissler supra note 148, at 139–40 (rejecting argument for adverse posses- R
sion-like-approach for losing copyright abilities when no takedown notice is
issued).
156. For further discussion of Viacom, see supra notes 149–153 and accompa- R
nying text.
157. For further discussion of DMCA’s strength, see supra notes 143–149 and R
accompanying text.
158. For further discussion of leagues’ fears on piracy and how it should not
be considered a threat, see infra notes 160–171 and accompanying text. R
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leagues a wealth of statutes and caselaw to protect their product
and to allow them to excel in the streaming market, just like con-
sumers want them to.159
III. STREAMING FOR A CONTENT DRIVEN MARKET WHERE SPORTS
ARE NO LONGER THE TREND SETTER
Sports leagues currently register every broadcasted game in or-
der to maintain ownership over all televised material.160  Courts
consistently rule leagues are the sole authors of their broadcasts,
and these rulings support the leagues’ initiative to continually regis-
ter every broadcasted event in recent years.161  For example, an un-
authorized party could post copyrighted material of an event, such
as a live stream link to in-game-content, and the overseeing league
could file for an infringement violation against the party.162  The
NFL specifically uses a different approach, opting to send “mass
takedown notices” to unauthorized parties who infringe on the
League’s content.163  Because these notices are sent in mass form,
they fail to distinguish between posts violating copyright law and
posts complying with the League’s fair use policy.164
The NFL could learn from the NBA and MLB in this re-
spect.165  The NBA focuses on identifying parties who rebroadcast
159. For further discussion of leagues’ collective wealth of statutes and
caselaw, see supra notes 80–152 and accompanying text. R
160. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 765 (discussing NFL’s ownership interest R
of material); see also Gebert, supra note 93, at 1 (providing example of NFL’s “ag-
gressive intellectual property protections” with announcements for every NFL
game: “This telecast is copyrighted by NFL Productions for the private use of our
audience.  Any other use of this telecast or any pictures, descriptions, or accounts
of the game without the NFL’s consent is prohibited”).  However, leagues do not
need to register their copyrights to maintain ownership. See 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1990) (creating automatic copyright protection where authors meet both origi-
nality and fixation requirements, but not requiring registration).  For further dis-
cussion of copyright registration practice, see supra note 122 and accompanying R
text.
161. See, e.g., Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 942–45 (8th Cir.
2016) (reasoning for registering broadcasted events under copyright acts); see gen-
erally 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2018) (providing statute indicating who owns material).
162. For further discussion of examples, fair use practices, and violations, see
infra notes 176–185 and accompanying text. R
163. See Jeffrey Cobia, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Pro-
cedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.
387, 392, 399–400 (2009) (suggesting too much control by leagues in violation of
fair use policy).
164. For further discussion of fair use policy, see infra notes 172–187 and ac- R
companying text.
165. See Rissler supra note 148, at 13 (“[T]he NBA[‘s] marketing strategy R
seems to embrace the changes embodied by the new frontier of social media and
view it as an ally and an asset.”).
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full, unauthorized games, “rather than chasing down every little im-
age that may pop up and potentially frustrate its fans.”166  NBA
Commissioner, Adam Silver, summarized the league’s rationale for
using this technique.167  He said, “We have always believed that fans
sharing highlights via social media is a great way to drive interest
and excitement in the NBA. . . . Our enforcement efforts are not
aimed at fans, but rather are focused on the unauthorized live
streaming of our games.”168  The NFL could also follow the exam-
ple of the MLB, which recently partnered with the social media
platform Snapchat.169  The two collaborated to create “Snapchat
Day,” where MLB players were allowed to use Snapchat during
spring training games to engage with fans and live stream con-
tent.170  The use of social media and sharing of content online is
proof leagues can strike a balance to control copyrighted
material.171
A. Fair Use Policy: Examining Equitable Consumption and
Leagues’ Unfair Takedown Tactics
The leagues’ frequent use of DMCA takedown notices seems to
contradict the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act.172  The fair
use provisions allow an individual to use copyrighted material with-
out infringing on the copyright.173  Fair use is the crux of copyright
166. See id. (providing examples of how NBA specifically is avoiding too much
control but also encouraging fans to access material).
167. See Steven Perlberg, Deadspin and SB Nation Are Back Tweeting Football
GIFs, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/deadspin-and-sb-
nation-are-back-tweeting-football-gifs-1445357918 [https://perma.cc/5FZ2-BLMP]
(reviewing NBA’s stance).
168. Id. (pointing out how sharing shorter clips and highlights promotes NBA
compared to illegally streaming games which hurts revenue).  The NBA has also
embraced sharing video clips on social media in order to generate more interest in
the sport among younger viewers which has been largely successful on such plat-
forms. See Roberto A. Ferdman, What the NBA Gets That the Other Big Sports Leagues
Don’t, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2015/04/06/what-the-nba-getsthat-the-other-big-sports-leagues-dont/ [https:/
/perma.cc/45WJ-CMHY] (discussing use of newer social media platforms).
169. See Rissler, supra note 148, at 145 (suggesting adding social media in R
sporting events follows encouraging view for fans’ use of social media).
170. See id. (providing MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred’s desire to share
baseball “on as many platforms as possible.  And . . . strike a realistic balance be-
tween protecting what we regard to be very valuable intellectual property rights on
the one hand with allowing fans to use as many platforms as possible”).
171. See id. (noting skepticism of piracy and issues surrounding fan use).
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (depicting fair use practices).  For further dis-
cussion of takedown notices violating fair use policy, see infra notes 187–192 and R
accompanying text.
173. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 478 (referring to fair use as “for a legiti- R
mate purpose” and how copyright protection is not boundless); see also Rissler,
25
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law because it allows the public to use copyrighted works without
asking permission from the copyright holder as long as the use of
the material does not “unduly interfere with the copyright owner’s
market for a work.”174  There are four factors to consider to deter-
mine whether a particular use will “unduly interfere” with the copy-
right owner’s rights: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantial-
ity used in relation to the copyrighted work; and, (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted
work.175
Under the first factor, the central issue is whether the material
differs or has been altered, and whether the alteration is transform-
ative in that it creates a new expression or message.176  Notably, the
fair use provisions of the Copyright Act state “the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . ,
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”177  This
means a consumer may live stream a televised game for non-com-
mercial use, but if the consumer is not streaming the game for an
educational purpose or one of the other listed purposes, then the
consumer is committing an infringement.178  If a consumer streams
a televised game and is accused of copyright infringement, he or
she cannot argue the game is newsworthy and should therefore be
protected under the First Amendment.179  This argument would
supra note 148, at 145–50 (detailing fair use policy and application).  For further R
discussion of fair use, see infra notes 174–186 and accompanying text. R
174. Fred Von Lohmann, Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years Under the
DMCA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., at 9 (2010), available at https://www.eff.org/files/
eff-unintended-consequences-12-years_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH7V-WE5J]
(referencing fair use ability to use copyrighted material).
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors).
176. See Rissler, supra note 148, at 148 (detailing purpose and use of material, R
and how if material is sufficiently different, then there is no infringement).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added) (noting what is not considered in-
fringing on copyrighted material).
178. See, e.g., New Bos. Television v. Entm’t Sports Programming Network
(No. 81-1010-Z), 1981 WL 1374, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 1981) (suggesting viola-
tions of fair use policy even if stream is non-commercial and not for educational
purposes).  In Bos. Television, the court held rebroadcasting highlights from a news
program, without a license, could constitute substantiality for purposes of a fair use
analysis. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 480 (reviewing Bos. Television and rejecting R
“any argument that the live streaming of televised game broadcasts from one’s
television set constitutes ‘fair use’”).
179. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 480 (discussing potential scenario). R
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fail because the fair use doctrine does not permit a consumer to
stream an event by copying the protected broadcast.180
The second factor in the fair use analysis pertains to the nature
of the copyrighted work, and it focuses on the actual act of broad-
casting games, rather than the material shown.181  The third factor,
which looks at the amount and substantiality used in relation to the
copyrighted material, usually focuses on the length of the infringe-
ment for streaming infringement cases.182  Under this factor, live
rebroadcasting of smaller portions of an event may be perceived as
substantial.183  Finally, the fourth factor pertains to the effect of the
use upon the market and value of the work, and it focuses on the
material’s overall impact on the broadcasting and sports indus-
tries.184  Copyright holders have a strong incentive to protect their
works and may determine when and how a copyright is violated.185
The fair use provisions provide a useful framework for determining
when an action constitutes a violation of a copyright holder’s
rights.186
Given the context of the fair use policy, it appears the NFL is
ignoring the fair use statute to monopolize and control any mate-
rial associated with its name.187  The NFL goes too far to prevent
consumers from using or streaming content in ways that would be
deemed fair uses.188 National Basketball Association v. Motorola,
Inc.189 suggests the NFL may be extending its reach with the NFL’s
180. See id. (arguing courts should not use fair use doctrine to ignore copy-
rights when underlying material is of public importance).
181. See Rissler, supra note 148, at 148 (distinguishing results and actual show- R
ing of event).
182. See id. at 149 (discussing social media app, Vine, which shows only six
second clips and “would almost certainly qualify as ‘de minimis’ infringement of a
copyright”).
183. See, e.g., New Bos. Television, 1981 WL 1374, at *2 (holding unlicensed
rebroadcasting of highlights would likely violate fair use purposes).
184. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 480 (“[T]here is little doubt that the live R
streaming of televised sports broadcast has a negative effect on the market.”).
185. See, e.g., New Bos. Television, 1981 WL 1374, at *3 (establishing that copy-
right holder brings claim alleging injury from negative effect in markets).
186. See Rissler, supra note 148, at 145–46 (examining fair use provisions’ R
application).
187. See David Post, Are You Ready for Some Football? (Copyright Department),
WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con
spiracy/wp/2016/02/03/are-you-ready-for-some-football-copyright-department/
?utm_term=.6697dfb3ece6 [https://perma.cc/HR5B-X74P] (reporting on mo-
nopoly-like grasp used by NFL).
188. See id. (discussing whether legally and morally wrong for NFL to aggres-
sively litigate against individuals over copyright disputes).
189. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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telecast warning.190 Motorola reasoned a league makes inaccurate
statements when it delivers a warning against the use of pictures,
descriptions, or accounts of the game without the league’s consent
because the “sporting event itself and the data resulting from it are
not ‘authored’ content that is copyrightable.”191  Therefore, the tel-
ecast warnings are deceptive, misrepresent copyright law, and mis-
lead consumers’ fair use rights.192
Even though the SBA protects leagues against antitrust viola-
tions, the NFL’s telecast warnings arguably conflict with Section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act when handling social media.193  Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine.194
Most copyright infringements are not used for a commercial
nature and therefore would not violate the fair use policy.195  Simi-
larly, most infringements do not have a significant influence on the
market or value of the copyrighted work and therefore would also
not violate the fair use policy.196  Such infringements are likely safe
within the fair use statute.197  The fair use provisions put the NFL at
a high risk of exposure to lawsuits from falsely accused infringers,
190. See id. at 846 (reviewing legality of telecast warning).
191. See Gebert, supra note 93, at 5 (quoting NBA v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d at R
846) (discussing what is protected under copyright law in context of sporting
events).
192. See Eric Bangeman, FTC Complaint Flags NFL, MLB, Studios for Overstating
Copyright Claims, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 1, 2007, 9:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2007/08/ftc-complaint-flags-nfl-mlb-studios-for-overstating-copyright-
claims/ [https://perma.cc/JU4B-9RJB] (suggesting overreach by NFL’s warnings);
see also Rissler, supra note 148, at 140, 152 (arguing that relaxing aggressive policy R
on takedown notices would be more reasonable approach).
193. See Gebert, supra note 93, at 7 (discussing issues with antitrust violations). R
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (providing text of Sherman Act).
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (pointing out copyrighted broadcasts); see also Rissler,
supra note 148, at 147 (discussing fair use policy). R
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (noting commercial use).
197. See id. (stating safe harbor provisions).
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adding another reason why leagues should opt to stream their own
content.198
B. Boxing It All Up: Leagues Should Adapt Coverage and
Provide Easy Access to Sports Outside the TV Box, or
Fight Off Piracy
Sports leagues can and should capitalize on consumers’ attrac-
tion to live streams of sporting events to optimize the amount of
consumers they reach and earn more money from advertisers.199
The NFL, despite its aforementioned shortcomings, successfully did
this when it awarded Yahoo the sole rights to stream coverage of a
football game.200  This was the first time the NFL awarded stream-
ing rights, and Yahoo made the game available on all of its digital
platforms.201
Despite the potential for increased revenue, the sports industry
remains concerned about the surge in live streaming technology
because of the potential for unauthorized broadcasts of games.202
For sports leagues, “live-streaming apps . . . threaten TV’s golden
egg.”203  Leagues worry “piracy is easier than ever” because consum-
ers can “[j]ust hold a smartphone up to a television to record and
stream what is airing.”204  As a result, some leagues have imple-
198. For discussion of fair use provisions application and interpretation, see
supra notes 172–197 and accompanying text. R
199. See Kevin Clark, Yahoo Wins Rights to NFL’s First Streaming-Only Game, WALL
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-wins-rights-to-nfls-first-internet-only-
streaming-game-next-season-1433343642 [https://perma.cc/YCL3-6XAH] (last
updated Jun. 3, 2015, 3:53 PM) (suggesting first live streamed game would attract
many online viewers).
200. See id. (reporting Yahoo as first to live stream NFL game).
201. See id. (discussing use of “a Web browser, within a Yahoo app on a mobile
phone, or on a television equipped for streaming video”).
202. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 476 n.34 (referring to Compl. at ¶ 38, R
Showtime Networks, Inc. v. John Doe (No. 2:15-CV-03147), 2015 WL 1910767
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015) and temporary restraining order would prevent defen-
dant from infringing on exclusive broadcast rights of boxing match including “the
critical right of first transmission and publication of an extremely valuable sporting
event”).
203. See Cecilia Kang & Will Hobson, Periscope and Other New Apps Threaten TV’s
Golden Egg: Live Sports, WASH. POST (May 6, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/business/economy/new-apps-threaten-tv-networks-golden-egg-live-
sports/2015/05/05/b5d0b836-f347-11e4-84a6-6d7c67c50db0_story.html?noredi
rect=on&utm_term=.14542420d26c [https://perma.cc/82FQ-9RP9] (discussing
controversial view on live streaming sporting events and its threat to television).
204. Id. (noting piracy issues and smartphone capabilities); see also Bode,
supra note 45 (“Many users flocked to [streaming] services because they provided a R
less-expensive, more flexible alternative to traditional cable.  Now, if the industry
isn’t careful, it could lose a sizeable chunk of this newfound audience back to
piracy . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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mented stricter policies, including policies prohibiting media mem-
bers from streaming any content other than interviews after the
games.205
1. The Boxing Industry’s Embrace as a Model
Leagues can still transition into streaming content despite the
apprehension they may have to do so.206  The boxing industry pro-
vides a strong example of a successful transition, especially given
the piracy issues it faced during the boxing match between Floyd
Mayweather, Jr. and Manny Pacquiao.207  The 2015 match between
Pacquiao and Mayweather led to one of the largest mass piracy
events involving live streaming and sports.208  HBO and Showtime
broadcasted the fight, as the sole licensors, and sold access to view
the fight for approximately one hundred dollars.209  The networks
called it the “Fight of the Century” due to ongoing speculation of
the bout for years.210  Additionally, HBO and Showtime invested
heavily in advertising the match.211  They expected a massive gain
from selling pay-per-view access, and they ultimately made more
than four hundred million dollars in sales.212  But Manny Pac-
quiao’s promoter, Todd DeBoef, expressed concern over potential
piracy issues with the fight.213  He emphasized how piracy has
changed from “stealing pay-per-view through the boxes, and then it
205. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 476 (describing NBA and NHL policies). R
206. For further discussion of an example of a league’s transition into stream-
ing, see infra notes 207–228 and accompanying text. R
207. For further discussion of boxing’s success and lessons, see infra notes
208–229 and accompanying text. R
208. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 476 (citing Andrew Wallerstein, Did Boxing R
Match Start Fight Between Twitter, Hollywood? CHI. TRIB., May 6, 2015, at 6) (noting
fight occurred on May 2, 2015 and although piracy via live streaming is not new, “it
may well have achieved a new level of visibility this weekend”).
209. See id. (citing Scott Mayerowitz, Problems with the Fight? You Weren’t the Only
One, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 4, 2015)) (discussing price of boxing match and pro-
ducers’ cut).
210. See id. (suggesting hype and known success of fighters would attract large
audience).
211. See id. (indicating event was heavily promoted).
212. See Don Kaplan & Christian Red, Live Streams of Mayweather-Pacquiao Fight
Latest Battle in Fight Against Online Piracy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 4, 2015), https://
www.nydailynews.com/sports/online-piracy-cuts-hbo-profit-mayweather-pacquiao-
article-1.2210041 [https://perma.cc/QBY7-L7L9] (noting revenue despite mass
piracy and live streaming of boxing match).
213. See Darren Rovell, Periscope a Focus in Concern Over Lost Mayweather-Pac-
quiao PPV Orders, ESPN (May 5, 2015), http://www.espn.com/boxing/story/_/id/
12822727/illegal-streaming-periscope-arises-concern-lost-pay-per-view-orders-floyd-
mayweather-manny-pacquiao-fight  [https://perma.cc/F3ZF-V65T] (highlighting
apps used for streaming).
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moved to digital cards, and then it was through YouTube and web-
sites, and now, it’s [live streaming].”214  Unfortunately for the net-
works, DeBoef’s concerns proved to be valid.215  Although it is
unclear exactly how many pay-per-views of the fight were lost be-
cause of illegal streaming, one streaming site reported more than
10,000 people watched its live stream of the fight.216  The high vol-
ume of streamers also caused delays and lags on the networks’ pay-
per-view streams of the fight.217  An HBO executive even asked to
delay the fight by thirty minutes so the network could receive addi-
tional pay-per-view orders and then allow access for those
viewers.218
2. Applying Boxing’s Model in the Leagues
The boxing industry learned from its streaming issues and is
now embracing streaming as a method for reaching a wider audi-
ence.219  This decision to embrace streaming is a smart one, espe-
cially in light of a recent announcement by HBO, the leading
network in boxing coverage for the past forty-five years.220  HBO
announced on September 27, 2018, it would no longer televise box-
ing.221  In a statement accompanying the news, HBO wrote, “Our
214. Id. (referring to Twitter’s live streaming app Periscope as well as other
streaming services used to pirate fight).
215. See id. (discussing illegal streaming of event).
216. See id. (referring to link used by writer for tech site Mashable, meaning if
10,000 viewers were on one link at one hundred dollars per view, the result would
be one million dollars in lost revenue).  Consider a more recent fight, also includ-
ing Floyd Mayweather, against Conor McGregor, where reports suggest nearly
three million people pirated the fight. See Terry Collins, Millions Illegally Streamed
Mayweather-McGregor Fight, CNET (Aug. 29, 2017, 6:37 AM), https://www.cnet.com/
news/illegal-streaming-of-mayweather-mcgregor-fight-reaches-millions/ [https://
perma.cc/8462-UBNY?type=image] (“The company didn’t have data about how
many illegal streams had been created for Mayweather’s fight with fellow boxing
champ Manny Pacquiao in 2015.”).
217. See Rovell, supra note 213 (discussing issues with streaming). R
218. See id. (noting those who paid to view fight had issues with their own
stream).  DirecTV spokesman, Darris Gringeri suggested any large broadcasting
event comes with traffic jams when he said: “[t]his was the largest pay-per-view
event in our history, and, as with every other TV provider, there was a temporary
traffic jam that affected a small percentage of our consumers.” Id. (suggesting any
large broadcasting event comes with traffic jams).
219. For further discussion of boxing’s lesson from streaming events, see infra
notes 221–237 and accompanying text. R
220. See Dan Rafael, HBO to Drop Its Boxing Coverage at End of 2018, ESPN
(Sept. 27, 2018), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/24814171/hbo-
drop-boxing-coverage-end-2018 [https://perma.cc/2EGV-SHEN] (giving history
of HBO’s boxing events).
221. See id. (discussing HBO’s plan to abandon boxing coverage); see also Wal-
lace Matthews, HBO Says It is Leaving the Boxing Business, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/sports/hbo-boxing.html [https://
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mission at HBO Sports is to elevate the brand.  We look for televi-
sion projects that are high-profile, high access, and highly ambi-
tious.”222  The announcement came after one of HBO’s recent
fights, the bantamweight title eliminator of Juan Francisco Estrada
versus Felipe Orucuta.223  The fight drew only 298,000 viewers,
thereby becoming “one of the lowest-viewed fights in HBO his-
tory.”224  At HBO’s height in boxing coverage, it attracted as many
as five million viewers per fight.225  Now, of the nearly forty million
people who subscribe to HBO, an average of only 820,000 viewers
watched its boxing telecast in 2018.226  HBO’s statement touched
on the lack of consumers who watch televised fights, and it cited
streaming as part of its decision to cut boxing from its program-
ming.227  Specifically, the network pointed out that although
“[t]here is more boxing than ever being televised and distributed,”
streaming services and other programs have taken over, and the
programing is no longer unique.228
HBO’s statement about the prevalence of streaming is accu-
rate.229  For example, one subscription video streaming service,
DAZN, recently signed a one billion dollar agreement with the pro-
motional company Matchroom Boxing to provide a streaming ser-
vice for boxing fights over the next eight years.230  Additionally, in
August 2018, ESPN agreed to a deal with Top Rank, a boxing pro-
motion company, to air fifty-four matches, including on ESPN Plus,
perma.cc/B5XQ-DDTJ] (noting HBO had no fights scheduled after October 27,
2018).
222. Rafael, supra note 220 (noting announcement was not shocking because R
“[t]he network’s commitment to the sport has clearly waned in recent years and its
quality of fights has dropped at a time when there has been more competition”) (emphasis
added).
223. See id. (noting when HBO made its decision).
224. Id. (pointing out decline in viewership of HBO covered fights); cf. Mat-
thews, supra note 221 (noting viewers at 349,000 for same fight, but still listing as R
“one of the lowest-rated boxing matches in HBO’s history”).
225. See Matthews, supra note 221 (discussing peak of HBO’s boxing R
coverage).
226. See id. (suggesting viewership is about two percent of total audience, op-
posed to one third of its consumers during peak of boxing coverage).
227. See Rafael, supra note 220 (examining HBO’s decision to abandon R
boxing).
228. Id. (emphasis added) (suggesting programing is not unique enough to
consistently attract more viewers).
229. For further discussion of prevalence of streaming boxing events, see infra
notes 230–232 and accompanying text. R
230. See Matthews, supra note 221 (providing fights on DAZN at $9.99 per R
month through internet and smartphone apps).
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a subscription-based streaming service.231  However, even though
ESPN has a streaming service, the boxing matches it streams may
continue to reach a smaller audience because ESPN saw its sub-
scribers decline from one hundred million to eighty-seven million
in 2012.232
ESPN’s deal with Top Rank also benefits the network by pro-
viding it with an opportunity to collaboratively dictate the schedule
of fights aired, further illustrating the value added when embracing
streaming.233  Typically, the major sports leagues are able to control
the scheduling, thereby limiting ESPN’s say in its broadcasting
choices.234  During this process, the sports leagues would buy com-
mercial slots on the broadcasted channel to advertise an event, and
the sports league would sell sponsorship to the venue signs.235
However, because ESPN and Top Rank invested together, the two
are able to “smooth out” the most important aspect—the advertis-
ing dollars—by engaging in a collaborative process to sell as much
advertising as possible.236  So far, ESPN has achieved this by airing
Top Rank fights after other notable events, such as college foot-
ball’s Heisman award ceremony, and future NBA All-Star games
and Super Bowls.237
The boxing industry’s success with streaming has kept the
sport afloat at a time where ratings have decreased in major sports
leagues in recent years.238  During the majority of the 2017 season,
231. See Kevin Draper, Checking in on ESPN’s Big Bet on Boxing. (Yes, Boxing.),
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/sports/espn-
boxing.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/8HK2-LRPG] (noting seven-year
deal to air on various outlets, including ESPN and ABC, both owned by Disney,
and ESPN Plus, its streaming service, with aim to “alter the economics and visibility
of boxing”) (emphasis added).
232. See id. (suggesting consumers decide to live more and more without pay-
for channels); see also Mathews, supra note 1, at 220–21 (indicating ESPN “is now R
feeling the effects of the changing media landscape”).  In 2015, reports suggested
ESPN lost seven percent of its subscription base since 2011. See Becky Sullivan,
Once Immune to Cord-Cutting, ‘King of Live Sports’ Finds Throne Shaken, NPR (July 19,
2015, 5:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/19/424447488/ onceimmune-to-
cord-cutting-king-of-live-sports-finds-throne-shaken [https://perma.cc/9XL4-
HF9V] (“[T]he trend is accelerating: 3.2 million subscribers have left since May
2014.”).
233. For further discussion of boxing’s ability to plan and schedule with
ESPN, see infra notes 234–237 and accompanying text. R
234. See Draper, supra note 231 (“ESPN usually falls prey to . . . major sports R
leagues that set the scheduling.”).
235. See id. (juxtaposing how Top Rank and ESPN are operating).
236. See id. (obtaining this advertising goal “has so far eluded the sport”).
237. See id. (“Top Rank doesn’t particularly care on which Saturday nights its
bouts take place.  It happily created a card for after the Heisman ceremony . . . .”).
238. See, e.g., Ken Belson et al., TV Viewership Falls in N.F.L. and Premier League:
A Blip, or Something Worse?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
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the NFL’s television ratings were down by eight percent.239  Ver-
izon, as the parent company of Yahoo, expanded its role in live
streaming by agreeing to a deal with the NFL to live stream all local
market and national games on Verizon-owned media properties.240
A unique aspect of the deal allows Verizon to create jointly devel-
oped original NFL content.241
The NFL started to expand streaming options in 2014 when
Verizon agreed to stream games for free via the NFL Mobile app.242
The NFL continued to offer live streams of games in 2015 when it
struck a deal to allow Yahoo to provide free live streaming of a
game in London, and in 2017 when the NFL allowed Amazon to
stream eleven Thursday night national football games.243  NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell apparently recognizes that streaming
is a significant trend.244  He stated that more fans are moving to
devices such as smart phones to obtain content, and he said the
2016/10/27/sports/football/tv-viewership-falls-in-nfl-and-epl-a-blipor-something-
worse.html [https://perma.cc/V67M-3CL9] (focusing on Premier League ratings,
English soccer league, and NFL ratings decrease).  A recent report looked at the
ratings dip in NFL viewership, focusing on political protests, but found cord cut-
ting, good football, and home team loyalty controlled the audience more. See Matt
Wynn & John Kelly, In NFL Ratings, Good Football Trumps Politics, USA TODAY (Oct.
9, 2018, 12:16 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2018/10/09/
trump-nfl-ratings. . .rotests-what-data-really-show-anthem-kneeling-viewership/
996531002/ [https://perma.cc/K2HX-R2YK] (“The data show that quality foot-
ball and home team loyalty drove the TV audience far more than political tribal-
ism.”).  USA Today’s report looked at areas where ratings dropped the most, as
well as President “Trump-leaning markets” which happened to have “bad football.”
See id. (discussing decrease in ratings is not surprising given how often people are
cutting their cable).  “The NFL remains the king of TV ratings.  All TV program-
ming is taking a ratings hit as cord-cutting consumers switch to streaming services and
other digital entertainment options. . . . [A] whopping 37 of the 50 top-rated shows in
2017 were NFL games, Nielsen says.” Id. (emphasis added) (pointing out success
and consumer’s preferences with streaming abilities).
239. See Daniel Roberts, Verizon Strikes Extensive Live-Streaming Deal with NFL,
YAHOO! FINANCE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/verizon-
strikes-extensive-live-streaming-deal-nfl-132440572.html/ [https://perma.cc/
GKQ7-DVU9] (noting through thirteen of seventeen weeks of NFL season and
how political controversy has added to this decline).
240. See id. (providing deal is available for all consumers regardless of mobile
network via Verizon media properties such as Yahoo Sports and AOL).  Local mar-
ket games include those within a certain area—for example: “You will still not be
able to stream an out-of-market Sunday game, such as the Patriots vs Broncos on a
Sunday at 1pm if you live in New York City.” Id. (reporting that national market
games include those broadcasted for every market).
241. See id. (highlighting importance of original content).
242. See id. (detailing expansion to streaming).
243. See id. (laying out deals made over past several years); see also Kaufman,
supra note 3 (reporting on Amazon buying out Twitter’s deal with NFL for Thurs- R
day night games).
244. See Roberts, supra note 239 (noting leagues’ awareness of streaming R
trends).
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NFL expects to receive two hundred million unique visitors per
month on its mobile and digital sources.245  Twitter also agreed to
live stream NFL games, and it struck additional streaming deals
with the MLB, NHL, the Wimbledon tennis tournament, and Pac-
12 college sports.246
3. An Example of Networks Embracing Streaming
Several broadcast stations have set up sports networks, similar
to the flagship ESPN program.247  For example, CBS Sports HQ
provides twenty-four-hour free content across different devices, and
it provides news, highlights, and analysis, including, “live news and
reporting with game previews . . . projects, and statistical break-
downs.”248  CBS saw success with CBSN, its streaming news network,
and it hopes to replicate CBSN with CBS Sports HQ and provide
material to digital platforms.249  The goal with CBS Sports HQ is to
attract viewers who do not subscribe to television programs.250
Younger viewers are more attracted to programming online
through “on-demand subscription services like Netflix, or over-the-
top live TV services like Sling TV, Hulu Live TV, YouTube TV and
245. See id. (suggesting partnership with streaming devices may reach more
users or in conjunction with television reach wider audience); cf. Henry Bushnell,
Inside the Complex World of Illegal Sports Streaming, YAHOO! SPORTS (Mar. 27, 2019,
12:08 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/inside-the-complex-world-of-illegal-sports-
streaming-040816430.html (reporting NBA relies on research that indicates there
is more interest in games than ratings reflect, likely due to piracy and streaming
calculations).
246. See Dittmore & Hutchins, supra note 75, at 14 (indicating “sports organi- R
zations are turning to alternative ways of reaching consumers”).
247. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, CBS Launches a 24/7 Streaming Sports News Network,
CBS Sports HQ, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/26/
cbs-launches-a-24-7-streaming-sports-news-network-cbs-sports-hq/ [https://
perma.cc/XF6N-C9MY] (describing launch of CBS Sports HQ).
248. Id. (explaining content provided); see also Brian Steinberg, CBS Launches
Streaming Sports-News Outlet CBS Sports HQ, VARIETY (Feb. 26, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/cbs-sorts-hq-live-streaming-1202710150/
(reporting how CBS Sports HQ will be available through “TV devices including
Amazon Fire TV, Apple TV and . . . mobile app[s] for iOS and Android”).
249. See Perez, supra note 247 (“[CBSN] grew to 287 million streams in 2017, R
up seventeen percent over 2016—which was an Election year . . . .”).
250. See id. (noting “younger viewers” no longer watch television because of
canceled subscriptions or they never signed up to begin with); see also Sahil Patel,
CBS Aims To Grow Sports HQ within its Network of Streaming Channels, DIGIDAY (Dec.
24, 2018), https://digiday.com/media/cbs-aims-to-grow-sports-hq-within-its-net-
work-of-streaming-channels/ [https://perma.cc/Q9PW-BJR3] (noting CBS Sports
HQ as “free, ad-supported streaming channel” focusing on viewers who no longer
pay for cable) (emphasis added).
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others.”251  This is what CBS is trying to mimic by adapting its sports
coverage and providing easy access to its content outside traditional
television.252
C. Changes in Consumers: Following the Ad Dollars, Increasing
Prices, and Unbundling Sports from Cable
Amidst the change in technology, cable costs have gone up,
and viewership has gone down.253  With these developments, con-
sumers tend to look for different options within pay-TV, or cable
bundles, to satisfy their interests.254  In 2013, the pay-TV industry
lost subscribers for the first time in history after customers switched
to smaller bundled packages.255  For example, by 2014, ESPN
reached fewer homes than it had in 2010.256  Many advertisers are
“terrified” of the ratings plunge, which is directly attributable to the
rise in streaming services.257
Viewership fluctuated during the 2018 NFL season.258  For ex-
ample, CBS’s coverage of the 1:00 PM week-one NFL games was
251. Perez, supra note 247 (discussing streaming services); see also Patel, supra R
note 250 (reporting on CBS Sports HQ’s “strong interest from advertisers” due to R
digital inventory).
252. See Perez, supra note 247 (highlighting CBS’s goal, as former Chairman R
and CEO Leslie Moonves stated: “we are creating best-in-class direct-to-consumer
streaming platforms that are positioning us to be leaders in the future of premium
content distribution”) (emphasis added).  Over-the-top TV is a term used for content
provided via internet, without a cable subscription or satellite pay-TV. See Sahil
Patel, WTF is OTT?, DIGIDAY (July 7, 2015), https://digiday.com/media/what-is-
over-the-top-ott/ [https://perma.cc/Y8CV-F7HU] (explaining OTT as over-the-
top, and looking at its development in streaming and traditional cable).
253. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 204 (examining increase in cost for tradi- R
tional cable TV, due to live sports broadcasting rights, although consumers have
begun canceling subscriptions at record rates); see also Wynn & Kelly, supra note
238 (“As has been well-documented, NFL viewership on TV was down in most R
places.”).  For further discussion of decrease in viewership, see supra note 239 and R
accompanying text.
254. See Popper, supra note 7 (reporting loss of subscribers and decline in R
viewership, not just of cable, but sport broadcasts as well).
255. See id. (observing decline in customers and change in preferences).
256. See id. (suggesting change in trends for viewership).  For further discus-
sion of ESPN’s decreased viewers, see supra note 232 and accompanying text. R
257. See Popper, supra note 7 (discussing advertisers’ fear); see also Suzanne R
Vranica & Shalini Ramachandran, Cable TV Group Blames Subscription Web TV for
Ratings Woes, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2015, 6:41 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/
2015/03/10/cable-tv-group-blames-subscription-web-tv-for-ratings-woes/ [https://
perma.cc/SR8J-64X7] (suggesting forty percent of recent ratings decline in 2014
and 2015 were attributed to subscriptions like Netflix, Amazon and Hulu).
258. See generally Shalise Manza Young, NFL ratings: Early Games See Big Bounce,
Primetime Game Slight Dip, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 10, 2018, 11:16 AM), https://
sports.yahoo.com/nfl-ratings-early-games-see-big-bounce-primetime-game-slight-
dip-151625983.html [https://perma.cc/6NGL-T3XJ] (noting viewer increase in
earlier scheduled games but decrease in nationally covered games).
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shown on roughly ten and a half percent of all United States televi-
sions, up twenty-three percent from 2017.259  However, Fox’s NFL
coverage of the 4:00 PM week-one national game reached roughly
fifteen and a half percent of United States televisions, less than sev-
eral other week-one showings in the last decade.260  The viewership
statistics for the primetime game were more surprising.261  NBC’s
broadcast at 8:30 PM drew fewer viewers than it did in 2017 and
2016.262  Meanwhile, ESPN’s Monday Night Football also saw a
drop in viewership compared to recent years.263  The dip in ratings
has been attributed to political protests, blowouts in games, and
other scheduled programming.264  But it is also attributable to a
general decrease in television viewership, a fact which supports why
the NFL should consider more streaming deals.265
For example, consumers no longer find value in the traditional
cable TV bundling structure.266  Bundling cable originally appealed
to consumers by giving them the ability to package numerous chan-
nels.267  It also allowed networks to reduce transaction costs, result-
ing in an easier profit for networks.268  However, bundling’s value
259. See id. (suggesting successful reach of NFL).
260. See id. (pointing out Fox’s coverage was shown in eighty percent of mar-
kets, due to blackout restrictions of other local games, and 15.7 percent is ranked
“seventh-most watched late-afternoon game since 2004”).
261. See generally Chris Cwik, ESPN’s ‘Monday Night Football’ Ratings Down After
Two Weeks, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 18, 2018, 1:40 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/
espns-monday-night-football-ratings-two-weeks-174026627.html [https://perma.cc
/A7N3-F2UR] (reviewing primetime ratings of NFL games).
262. See Manza, supra note 258 (noting decrease from 15.8 percent to 14.4 R
percent this year).
263. See Cwik, supra note 261 (discussing past years and potential reasons). R
264. See id. (listing President Donald Trump’s concerns with NFL, TV shows
“no longer pull massive ratings,” Monday Night Football’s Week 1 game resulted in
blowout, and Week 2 aired during seventieth Primetime Emmy Awards).  “ESPN’s
Week 2 game had to compete with the Emmys . . . which also hit a new low for
ratings.” Id. (noting potential explanations for drop in viewership).  For further
discussion of the Emmys, see supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
265. See generally James Surowiecki, Bundles of Cable, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 25,
2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/01/25/bundles-of-cable
[https://perma.cc/V95Z-FMK3] (reporting on decreased viewership and less
cable subscribers).  For further discussion of a general decrease in television
viewership, see infra notes 266–274 and accompanying text. R
266. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 218 (suggesting TV bundling has played R
large role for live sports and television industry); see also Surowiecki, supra note 265 R
(“[C]able TV has always relied on ‘bundling’ . . . .”).
267. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 218 (detailing how bundling channels R
works).
268. See id. (suggesting consumers may perceive bundling as “a bargain” and
reduced costs due to “option value”); see also Surowiecki, supra note 266 (“It also R
offers what economists call option value: you may never watch those sixty other
channels, but the fact that you could if you wanted to is worth something.”).
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has declined because of the loss of viewers and subscribers.269  Nev-
ertheless, the cost of cable TV continues to surpass inflation rates
year after year.270  The consistent rise in cable TV costs is directly
attributable to live sports.271  This argument is based on the notion
that “live sport is immune to changes in viewing patterns[,]” giving
the sports leagues a monopoly-like grasp on the TV industry.272
The leagues effectively have their say when they negotiate agree-
ments with networks, and they are able to demand increased prices
for their product.273  This causes subscribers to pay more for bun-
dled TV programs, whether they actually watch sports or not.274
The NFL’s decision to stream games for free, especially its deci-
sion to stream its first game in London, suggests that the league is
focused on using streaming to increase revenue and reach unserved
markets.275  The NFL may have also been drawn to streaming be-
cause it enables sports leagues to “bypass the cable TV providers”
and offer the content easily and directly to consumers.276  If the
NFL and other leagues opt to stream games, networks like ESPN
269. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 218 (relying on fact entire TV industry is R
declining in growth).
270. See id. at 218–19 n.131 (citing In re Implementation of Section 3 of the
Cable Television Consumer Prot. and Competition Act of 1992, 31 F.C.C. Rcd.
11498, 11513 (2016)) (examining years between 2005 and 2015).
271. See id. (implying leagues’ “monopolistic position” controls prices in TV
industry); see also Matthew Garrahan, TV Networks Face Shaky Future in Changing Me-
dia Landscape, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/15f65100-
4c9c-11e5-b558-8a9722977189 [https://perma.cc/P63K-K4HN] (“[S]port[s] is an
expensive business. . . .  NBC Sports and Fox Sports are vying for the same rights as
ESPN.  This has driven up the prices . . . a cost that is passed on to the cable and
satellite companies that pay to carry ESPN and, ultimately, to the consumers
. . . .”).
272. Garrahan, supra note 271 (suggesting live sports as cornerstone of broad- R
casting industry).
273. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 219 (discussing leagues’ power to raise R
prices).
274. See Surowiecki, supra note 266 (reporting on bundled packages includ- R
ing channels which may never be watched).
275. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 220 (broadening NFL’s reach to markets R
outside United States and areas affected by blackout restrictions).
276. See Greg Satell, How the Collapse of the Cable Business Model Will Bring a New
Era of Television, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/
2015/08/16/how-the-collapse-of-the-cable-businessmodel-will-bring-a-new-era-of-
television/#3e83f3a413de [https://perma.cc/NQD4-J67Z] (calling streaming op-
portunities like this “over the top” as it bypasses cable TV).  Television companies
profited from controlling distribution and determining which channels to carry.
See id. (“Rather than relying solely on advertising, they now had access to fees from
cable operators and, because the cable companies had near monopoly pricing
power, those fees could be substantial . . . .” (referring to MICHAEL WOLFF, TELEVI-
SION IS THE NEW TELEVISION: THE UNEXPECTED TRIUMPH OF OLD MEDIA IN THE DIGI-
TAL AGE (Portfolio 2015)).
38
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol26/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 39 15-MAY-19 12:00
2019] STREAMING IS THE NAME OF THE GAME 361
will be directly affected.277  Agreements to stream content via other
sources have directly affected ESPN because ESPN is losing con-
tracts to broadcast those events.278  Before leagues reexamine their
broadcasting contracts with television networks, they will need to
wait for their current contracts to expire.279
Future contracts may include significant changes to how con-
tent is distributed.280  For example, internet companies could be
the ones to gain from future sports broadcasting.281  This would ex-
plain many of the mergers among large television, media, and in-
ternet service conglomerates, as well as their decisions to keep
content in-house.282  Likewise, if consumers use internet services to
access content, then they obtain the material on-demand while
avoiding any copyright issues.283  Other options could include a
pay-per-view structure as opposed to free or all-access content on
277. See Sullivan, supra note 232 (touching on live streaming’s impact). R
278. See id. (claiming ESPN is no longer immune to changes in TV industry).
For an example of how ESPN is addressing the loss of broadcasts, see supra notes
231–237 and accompanying text. R
279. See Michael Colangelo, Future of Sports TV: Digital, A La Carte and Increased
Competition, FIELDS OF GREEN (Sept. 15, 2015), http://thefieldsofgreen.com/2015/
09/15/future-of-sportstv-digital-a-la-carte-and-increased-competition/ [https://
perma.cc/Y7J3-T3ZL] (explaining that NFL’s deal runs until 2022, NBA until
2023, and both NHL and MLB in 2021).  For further discussion of current televi-
sion contracts with sports leagues and the dates in place, see supra notes 63–65 and R
accompanying text.
280. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 221–22 (speculating about future of sports R
broadcasting, end TV bundling, and potential a-la-carte programming on internet
services); see also Colangelo, supra note 279 (discussing a-la-carte programming). R
281. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 40 (reporting Disney’s ownership of ESPN, R
acquisition of 21st Century Fox, and its majority stakeholder position of Hulu).
Competition over rights to air sporting events may become difficult between in-
ternet providers and television networks. See Kevin Draper, Is the Live Sports Rights
Bubble Finally Bursting?, DEADSPIN (May 03, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://deadspin.com/
is-the-live-sports-rights-bubble-finally-bursting-1774516030 [https://perma.cc/
77M4-CQJV] (“Twitter is currently paying 1/45th of what CBS and NBC are paying
to broadcast NFL games.  Nobody knows yet how to monetize the internet, and
rightsholders’ future profits in large part depend upon them being the ones to
finally figure it out.”).
282. See, e.g., Cecilia Kang & Edmund Lee, AT&T-Time Warner Deal Approval
Gets Justice Department Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/justice-department-plans-appeal-of-att-
time-warner-merger-approval.html [https://perma.cc/E4LH-YSN5] (examining
eighty-five billion dollar deal approved by federal judge to allow AT&T and Time
Warner merger, which companies view as “necessary to better compete against
tech giants like Netflix and Amazon”); see also Mathews, supra note 1, at 221–23 R
(hinting at internet service providers holding power for future broadcasting).
“[T]he emergence of internet streaming options will ultimately change the struc-
ture of sports broadcasting rights.”  Mathews, supra note 1, at 221–23 (“[G]iven the R
recent surge in internet[-]based streaming of video, including live events.”).
283. See Mathews, supra note 1, at 222 (pointing to consumers’ desires). R
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the internet.284  In a pay-per-view structure, consumers can pay on-
line any time they wish to view an event.285  Regardless of whether a
pay-per-view structure would work, one idea stands out: consumers’
preferences are changing, meaning internet providers and cable
television have some adjustments to make.286
IV. CONCLUSION: EMBRACE THE GAME AS IT CHANGES TO
STREAMING
Consumers are abandoning cable because internet services are
taking over and providing easy, commercial-free streaming op-
tions.287  Sports leagues should stay ahead of the game and em-
brace streaming options with internet service providers, instead of
relying on legislation to prevent unauthorized streaming of live
sports content.288  The SBA and copyright laws provide protection
to the leagues and attempt to prevent illegal streaming.289  How-
ever, if leagues continue to cling to these laws to defend their con-
tent, then leagues may lose the consumers and viewers who are
abandoning traditional cable.290
The fear of piracy is not a legitimate excuse for avoiding a tran-
sition to streaming services.291  In recent court decisions involving
sporting events and live streaming, courts have issued favorable rul-
ings for the leagues.292  Thus, the leagues’ fears of piracy should be
diminished.293  Leagues and sports broadcast partners can still rely
on copyright law to prevent and recover when unlicensed parties
live stream an event.294  Moreover, in the event an unlicensed party
284. See id. (suggesting future options similar to a-la-carte style).
285. See id. (discussing potential viewing structure).
286. For further discussion of consumers and changes in cable, see supra
notes 266–274 and accompanying text. R
287. For further discussion of streaming options, see supra notes 7–52 and R
accompanying text.
288. For further discussion of embracing streaming abilities compared to re-
strictive legislation, see supra notes 58–79 and accompanying text. R
289. For further discussion regarding SBA and copyright law’s protection, see
supra notes 80–142 and accompanying text. R
290. For further discussion of legislation and changes in traditional cable, see
supra notes 143–155 and 253–285 and accompanying text. R
291. For further discussion of piracy and lessons from past issues, see supra
notes 207–229 and accompanying text. R
292. See e.g., Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (ruling in
leagues’ favor over streaming app Aereo); see generally Dittmore & Hutchins, supra
note 75 (detailing Aereo case). R
293. For further discussion of piracy and lessons from past issues, see supra
notes 207–229 and accompanying text. R
294. For further discussion of copyright law, see supra notes 106–141 and ac- R
companying text.
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does live stream a game, the relevant league or sports broadcast
partner can still defend its right to its own content.295
Finally, if leagues are concerned with ad dollars, they should
focus on the consumers.296  The money always comes from the con-
sumers, and today’s consumers are focused on easy access to con-
tent through live streaming.297  Streaming is also a reliable source
of future income for sports leagues, because consumers and fans
continue to embrace technological changes in streaming.298  The
success of the numerous companies already streaming and control-
ling their own content confirms the benefit of embracing
change.299  Leagues should follow their example and adopt live
streaming as an alternative to the traditional methods of sports
broadcasting.300
Gregory Bailey*
295. For further discussion of controlling content, see supra notes 35–49 and R
accompanying text.
296. See PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 10–13 (suggesting consumers R
want to control the content and competition with streaming devices will increase
ad revenue).
297. For further discussion of consumers and ad dollars following streaming
services, see supra notes 253–285 and accompanying text. R
298. See generally PWC SPORTS OUTLOOK, supra note 8 (predicting sports mar- R
ket through 2022 focusing on sports media rights).
299. For further discussion of controlling content, see supra notes 35–49 and R
accompanying text.
300. For further discussion of future streaming services and success, see supra
notes 7–52 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. in Philosophy, George Washington University, 2015.  I would like to
thank my family and friends who have always encouraged and supported me
throughout my educational pursuits.
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